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Elonis v. United States
13-983
Ruling Below: United States of America v. Anthony Douglas Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir.
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014).
After his motion to dismiss his indictment was denied, defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of making threatening
communications, based on comments he posted on social networking website. Defendant
appealed.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black,
conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the
defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts
of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable
person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and
state courts of last resort; and (2) whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of
threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant's subjective
intent to threaten.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on September 19, 2013
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted]
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the question whether the
true threats exception to speech protection
under the First Amendment requires a jury
to find the defendant subjectively intended
his statements to be understood as threats.
Anthony Elonis challenges his jury
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c),
arguing he did not subjectively intend his

Facebook posts to be threatening. In United
States v. Kosma, we held a statement is a
true threat when a reasonable speaker would
foresee the statement would be interpreted
as a threat. We consider whether the
Supreme Court decision in Virginia v. Black,
overturns this standard by requiring a
subjective intent to threaten.
I.
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In May 2010, Elonis's wife of seven years
moved out of their home with their two
young children. Following this separation,
Elonis began experiencing trouble at work.
Elonis worked at Dorney Park & Wildwater
Kingdom amusement park as an operations
supervisor
and
a
communications
technician. After his wife left, supervisors
observed Elonis with his head down on his
desk crying, and he was sent home on
several occasions because he was too upset
to work.
One of the employees Elonis supervised,
Amber Morrissey, made five sexual
harassment reports against him. According
to Morrissey, Elonis came into the office
where she was working alone late at night,
and began to undress in front of her. She left
the building after he removed his shirt.
Morrissey also reported another incident
where Elonis made a minor female
employee uncomfortable when he placed
himself close to her and told her to stick out
her tongue. On October 17, 2010 Elonis
posted on his Facebook page a photograph
taken for the Dorney Park Halloween Haunt.
The photograph showed Elonis in costume
holding a knife to Morrissey's neck. Elonis
added the caption “I wish” under the
photograph. Elonis's supervisor saw the
Facebook posting and fired Elonis that same
day.

for all my friends and must have taken
home a couple. Ya'll think it's too dark
and foggy to secure your facility from a
man as mad as me. You see, even
without a paycheck I'm still the main
attraction. Whoever
thought
the
Halloween haunt could be so fucking
scary?
Elonis also began posting statements about
his estranged wife, Tara Elonis, including
the following: “If I only knew then what I
know now, I would have smothered your ass
with a pillow, dumped your body in the back
seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek, and
made it look like a rape and murder.”
Several of the posts about Tara Elonis were
in response to her sister's status updates on
Facebook. For example, Tara Elonis's sister
posted her status update as: “Halloween
costume shopping with my niece and
nephew should be interesting.” Elonis
commented on this status update, writing,
“Tell [their son] he should dress up as
matricide for Halloween. I don't know what
his costume would entail though. Maybe
[Tara Elonis's] head on a stick?” Elonis also
posted in October 2010:

Two days after he was fired, Elonis began
posting violent statements on his Facebook
page. One post regarding Dorney Park
stated:

There's one way to love you but a
thousand ways to kill you. I'm not going
to rest until your body is a mess, soaked
in blood and dying from all the little cuts.
Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust this
nut all over your corpse from atop your
shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy but
then you became a slut. Guess it's not
your fault you liked your daddy raped
you. So hurry up and die, bitch, so I can
forgive you.

Moles. Didn't I tell ya'll I had several?
Ya'll saying I had access to keys for the
fucking gates, that I have sinister plans

Based on these statements a state court
issued Tara Elonis a Protection From Abuse
order against Elonis on November 4, 2010.
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Did you know that it's illegal for me to
say I want to kill my wife?

I also found out that it's incredibly illegal,
extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and
say something like the best place to fire a
mortar launcher at her house would be
from the cornfield behind it because of
easy access to a getaway road and you'd
have a clear line of sight through the sun
room.

It's illegal.

Insanely illegal.

It's indirect criminal contempt.

Ridiculously,
illegal.

Following the issuance of the state court
Protection From Abuse order, Elonis posted
several statements on Facebook expressing
intent to harm his wife. On November 7 he
wrote:

It's one of the only sentences that I'm not
allowed to say.

wrecklessly,

insanely

Yet even more illegal to show an
illustrated diagram.

Now it was okay for me to say it right
then because I was just telling you that
it's illegal for me to say I want to kill my
wife.
I'm not actually saying it.
I'm just letting you know that it's illegal
for me to say that.
It's kind of like a public service.
I'm letting you know so that you don't
accidently go out and say something like
that
Um, what's interesting is that it's very
illegal to say I really, really think
someone out there should kill my wife.
That's illegal.
Very, very illegal.
But not illegal to say with a mortar
launcher.
Because that's its own sentence.
It's an incomplete sentence but it may
have nothing to do with the sentence
before that.
So that's perfectly fine.
Perfectly legal.

Insanely illegal.
Ridiculously, horribly felonious.
Cause they will come to my house in the
middle of the night and they will lock me
up.
Extremely against the law.
Uh, one thing that is technically legal to
say is that we have a group that meets
Fridays at my parent's house and the
password is sic simper tyrannis.
Tara Elonis testified at trial that she took
these statements seriously, saying, “I felt
like I was being stalked. I felt extremely
afraid for mine and my children's and my
families' lives.” Ms. Elonis further testified
that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and
that she had never seen Elonis write rap
lyrics during their seven years of
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marriage. She explained that the lyric form
of the statements did not make her take the
threats any less seriously.
On November 15 Elonis posted on his
Facebook page:
Fold up your PFA and put it in your
pocket Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
That was improperly granted in the first
place Me thinks the judge needs an
education on true threat jurisprudence
And prison time will add zeroes to my
settlement
Which you won't see a lick
Because you suck dog dick in front of
children
***
And if worse comes to worse
I've got enough explosives to take care of
the state police and the sheriff's
department
[link:
Freedom
www.wikipedia.org]

of

Speech,

This statement was the basis both of Count
2, threats to Elonis's wife, and Count 3,
threats to local law enforcement. A post the
following day on November 16 involving an
elementary school was the basis of Count 4:
That's it, I've had about enough
I'm checking out and making a name
for myself Enough elementary schools
in a ten mile radius to initiate the most
heinous
school
shooting
ever
imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man
in a kindergarten class

The only question is ... which one?
By this point FBI Agent Denise Stevens was
monitoring Elonis's public Facebook
postings, because Dorney Park contacted the
FBI claiming Elonis had posted threats
against Dorney Park and its employees on
his Facebook page. After reading these and
other Facebook posts by Elonis, Agent
Stevens and another FBI agent went to
Elonis's house to interview him. When the
agents knocked on his door, Elonis's father
answered and told the agents Elonis was
sleeping. The agents waited several minutes
until Elonis came to the door wearing a tshirt, jeans, and no shoes. Elonis asked the
agents if they were law enforcement and
asked if he was free to go. After the agents
identified themselves and told him he was
free to go, Elonis went inside and closed the
door. Later that day, Elonis posted the
following on Facebook:
You know your shit's ridiculous when
you have the FBI knockin' at yo' door
Little Agent Lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the
bitch ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her
throat Leave her bleedin' from her jugular
in the arms of her partner
[laughter]
So the next time you knock, you best be
serving a warrant
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives
expert while you're at it
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped
wit' a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to
get dressed with no shoes on?
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I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me
and pat me down
Touch the detonator in my pocket and
we're all goin'
[BOOM!]
These statements were the basis of Count 5
of the indictment. After she observed this
post on Elonis's Facebook page, Agent
Stevens contacted the U.S. Attorney's
Office.
II.
Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010
and charged with transmitting in interstate
commerce communications containing a
threat to injure the person of another in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The grand
jury indicted Elonis on five counts of
making threatening communications: Count
1 threats to patrons and employees of
Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom, Count
2 threats to his wife, Count 3 threats to
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police
and Berks County Sheriff's Department,
Count 4 threats to a kindergarten class, and
Count 5 threats to an FBI agent.
Elonis moved to dismiss the indictments
against him, contending the Supreme Court
held in Virginia v. Black that a subjective
intent to threaten was required under the true
threat exception to the First Amendment and
that his statements were not threats but were
protected speech. The District Court denied
the motion to dismiss because even if the
subjective intent standard applied, Elonis's
intent and the attendant circumstances
showing whether or not the statements were
true threats were questions of fact for the
jury.

Elonis testified in his own defense at trial. A
jury convicted Elonis on Counts 2 through 5,
and the court sentenced him to 44 months'
imprisonment followed by three years
supervised release. Elonis filed a post-trial
Motion to Dismiss Indictment with
Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3); and for New
Trial under Rule 33(a), to Arrest Judgment
under Rule 34(b) and/or Dismissal under
Rule 29(c). The District Court denied the
motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the
indictment correctly tracked the language of
the statute and stated the nature of the threat,
the date of the threat and the victim of the
threat. The court also stated the objective
intent standard conformed with Third
Circuit precedent. The court found the
evidence supported the jury's finding that
the statements in Count 3 and Count 5 were
true threats. Finally, the court held that the
jury instruction presuming communications
over the internet were transmitted through
interstate commerce was supported by our
precedent in United States v. MacEwan.
III.
A.
Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
875(c) for “transmit[ting] in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person
or any threat to injure the person of
another....” Elonis contends the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the
standard of a true threat. The court gave the
following jury instruction:
A statement is a true threat when a
defendant
intentionally
makes
a
statement in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable
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person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom
the maker communicates the statement as
a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an
individual.
Elonis posits that the Supreme Court
decision in Virginia v. Black requires that a
defendant subjectively intend to threaten,
and overturns the reasonable speaker
standard we articulated in United States v.
Kosma.
In United States v. Kosma, we held a true
threat requires that the defendant
intentionally make a statement, written or
oral, in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily
harm upon or to take the life of the
President, and that the statement not be the
result of mistake, duress, or coercion.
We rejected a subjective intent requirement
that the defendant “intended at least to
convey the impression that the threat was a
serious one.” We found “any subjective test
potentially frustrates the purposes of section
871—to prevent not only actual threats on
the President's life, but also the harmful
consequences which flow from such
threats.” We have held the same “knowingly
and willfully” mens rea Kosma analyzed
under 18 U.S.C. § 871, threats against the
president, applies to § 875(c). United States
v. Himelwright. Since our precedent is clear,
the question is whether the Supreme Court
decision in Virginia v. Black overturned this
standard.

The Supreme Court first articulated the true
threats exception to speech protected under
the First Amendment in Watts v. United
States. During a rally opposing the Vietnam
war, Watts told the crowd, “I am not going.
If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The
Court reversed his conviction for making a
threat against the president. “The Court
articulated three factors supporting its
finding: 1. the context was a political
speech; 2. the statement was “expressly
conditional”; and 3. “the reaction of the
listeners” who “laughed after the statement
was made.” The Court did not address the
true threats exception again until Virginia v.
Black in 2003.
In Virginia v. Black the Court considered a
Virginia statute that banned burning a cross
with the “intent of intimidating” and
provided “[a]ny such burning of a cross
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.”
The Court reviewed three separate
convictions of defendants under the statute
and concluded that intimidating cross
burning could be proscribed as a true threat
under the First Amendment. But the prima
facie evidence provision violated due
process, because it permitted a jury to
convict whenever a defendant exercised his
or her right to not put on a defense.
The Court reviewed the historic and
contextual meanings behind cross burning,
and found it conveyed a political message, a
cultural message, and a threatening message,
depending on the circumstances. The Court
then described the true threat exception
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generally before analyzing the Virginia
statute:
“True
threats”
encompass
those
statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence” and “from the disruption that
fear engenders,” in addition to protecting
people “from the possibility that the
threatened
violence
will
occur.”
Intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type
of true threat, where a speaker directs a
threat to a person or group of persons
with the intent of placing the victim in
fear
of
bodily
harm
or
death. Respondents do not contest that
some cross burnings fit within this
meaning of intimidating speech, and
rightly so. As noted in Part II, the history
of cross burning in this country shows
that cross burning is often intimidating,
intended to create a pervasive fear in
victims that they are a target of violence.
Elonis contends that this definition of true
threats means that the speaker must both
intend to communicate and intend for the
language to threaten the victim. But the
Court did not have occasion to make such a
sweeping holding, because the challenged
Virginia statute already required a subjective
intent to intimidate. We do not infer from
the use of the term “intent” that the Court
invalidated the objective intent standard the
majority of circuits applied to true threats.
Instead, we read “statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of

unlawful violence” to mean that the speaker
must intend to make the communication. It
would require adding language the Court did
not write to read the passage as “statements
where the speaker means to communicate
[and intends the statement to be understood
as] a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence.” This is
not what the Court wrote, and it is
inconsistent with the logic animating the
true threats exception.
The “prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s]
individuals from the fear of violence’ and
‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in
addition to protecting people ‘from the
possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.’ ” Limiting the definition of true
threats to only those statements where the
speaker subjectively intended to threaten
would fail to protect individuals from “the
fear of violence” and the “disruption that
fear engenders,” because it would protect
speech that a reasonable speaker would
understand to be threatening.
Elonis
further
contends
the
unconstitutionality of the prima facie
evidence provision in Black indicates a
subjective intent to threaten is required. The
Court found the fact that the defendant
burned a cross could not be prima facie
evidence of intent to intimidate. The Court
explained that while cross burning was often
employed as intimidation or a threat of
physical violence against others, it could
also function as a symbol of solidarity for
those within the white supremacist
movement. Less frequently, crosses had
been burned outside of the white
supremacist context, such as stage
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performances. Since the burning of a cross
could have a constitutionally-protected
political message as well as a threatening
message, the prima facie evidence provision
failed to distinguish protected speech from
unprotected threats. Furthermore, the prima
facie evidence provision denied defendants
the right to not put on a defense, since the
prosecution did not have to produce any
evidence of intent to intimidate, which was
an element of the crime.
We do not find that the unconstitutionality
of Virginia's prima facie evidence provision
means the true threats exception requires a
subjective intent to threaten. First, the prima
facie evidence provision did not allow the
factfinder to consider the context to construe
the meaning of the conduct, whereas the
reasonable person standard does encompass
context to determine whether the statement
was a serious expression of intent to inflict
bodily harm. Second, cross-burning is
conduct that may or may not convey a
meaning, as opposed to the language in this
case which has inherent meaning in addition
to the meaning derived from context.
Finally, the prima facie evidence provision
violated the defendant's due process rights to
not put on a defense, because the defendant
could be convicted even when the
prosecution had not proven all the elements
of the crime. That is not an issue here
because the government had to prove that a
reasonable person would foresee Elonis's
statements would be understood as threats.
The majority of circuits that have considered
this question have not found the Supreme
Court decision in Black to require a
subjective intent to threaten.

The Fourth Circuit in United States v.
White considered the same criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and found the
Court in Black “gave no indication it was
redefining a general intent crime such as §
875(c) to be a specific intent crime.” The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Black had
analyzed a statute that included a specific
intent element, whereas § 875(c) had
consistently been applied as a general intent
statute.
The
court
further
distinguished Black by noting the multiple
meanings of cross-burning necessitated a
finding of intent to distinguish protected
speech from true threats. The court
in White found this same problem did not
exist for threatening language because it has
no First Amendment value. Finally, the
court found the general intent standard for §
875(c) offenses did not chill “statements of
jest or political hyperbole” because “any
such statements will, under the objective
test, always be protected by the
consideration of the context and of how a
reasonable recipient would understand the
statement.”
In United States v. Jeffries the Sixth Circuit
agreed that Black does not require a
subjective intent to threaten to convict
under 18
U.S.C.
§
875(c). Because Black interpreted a statute
that already had a subjective intent
requirement, the Sixth Circuit found the
Court was not presented with the question
whether an objective intent standard is
constitutional. Jeffries also found that the
Court's ruling on the prima facie evidence
provision did not address the specific intent
question because “the statute lacked any
standard at all.” Like the Fourth Circuit
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in White, the Sixth Circuit explained that the
prima facie evidence provision failed to
distinguish between protected speech and
threats by not allowing for consideration of
any contextual factors. In contrast, “[t]he
reasonable-person standard winnows out
protected speech because, instead of
ignoring context, it forces jurors to examine
the circumstances in which a statement is
made.” The Ninth Circuit took a different
view, and found the true threats definition
in Black requires the speaker both intend to
communicate and “intend for his language
to threaten the victim.” The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the unconstitutionality of the
prima facie provision meant that the Court
required a finding of intent to threaten for all
speech labeled as “true threats,” and not just
cross burning. “We are therefore bound to
conclude that speech may be deemed
unprotected by the First Amendment as a
‘true threat’ only upon proof that the speaker
subjectively intended the speech as a
threat.”
Regardless of the state of the law in the
Ninth Circuit, we find that Black does not
alter our precedent. We agree with the
Fourth Circuit that Black does not clearly
overturn the objective test the majority of
circuits applied to § 875(c). Black does not
say that the true threats exception requires a
subjective intent to threaten. Furthermore,
our standard does require a finding of intent
to communicate. The jury had to find Elonis
“knowingly and willfully” transmitted a
“communication containing ... [a] threat to
injure the person of another.” A threat is
made “knowingly” as when it is “made
intentionally and not [as] the result of
mistake, coercion or duress.” A threat is

made willfully when “a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily
harm.” This objective intent standard
protects non-threatening speech while
addressing the harm caused by true threats.
Accordingly, the Kosma objective intent
standard applies to this case and the District
Court did not err in instructing the jury.
B.
Elonis contends the indictment was
insufficient because it did not quote the
language of the allegedly threatening
statements. An indictment “must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense
charged.” An indictment is sufficient when
it “(1) contains the elements of the offense
intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently
apprises the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet, and (3) allows the
defendant to show with accuracy to what
extent he may plead a former acquittal or
conviction in the event of a subsequent
prosecution.” We have found an indictment
is sufficient “where it informs the defendant
of the statute he is charged with violating,
lists the elements of a violation under the
statute, and specifies the time period during
which the violations occurred.”
In Huet we found an indictment for aiding
and abetting a felon in possession of a
firearm was sufficient because it alleged the
previous felony conviction of the principal,
the time period of the violation and the
specific weapon involved, and alleged the
defendant “knowingly aided and abetted
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Hall's possession of that firearm.” “No
more was required to allow Huet to prepare
her defense and invoke double jeopardy.”
The Eighth Circuit considered an indictment
that did not include the verbatim contents of
a letter, the date it was written, or the name
of the author. The indictment for
communicating a threat to injure with the
intent to extort merely stated the letter
threatened to harm the reputation of the
victim with intent to extort. Since the
indictment summarized the contents of the
letter, provided the date it was mailed and
the name of the addressee, the Eighth Circuit
found there could be no confusion as to the
elements and subject of the crime.
To find a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) a
defendant must transmit in interstate or
foreign commerce a communication
containing a threat to injure or kidnap a
person. Here the indictment on Count 2
stated:
On or about November 6, 2010, through
on or about November 15, 2010, in
Bethlehem, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, defendant
ANTHONY
DOUGLAS
ELONIS
knowingly and willfully transmitted in
interstate and foreign commerce, via a
computer
and
the
Internet,
a
communication to others, that is, a
communication containing a threat to
injure the person of another, specifically,
a threat to injure and kill T. E., a person
known to the grand jury. In violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section
875(c).
The indictment on the other counts was
identical, but stated each date of the threat,
the nature of the threat, and the subjects of

the threat. Count 3 alleged “a threat to injure
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police
and the Berks County Sheriff's Department”;
Count 4 alleged “a threat to injure a
kindergarten class of elementary school
children”; and Count 5 alleged “a threat to
injure an agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.”
Elonis
contends
the
indictment was deficient because they did
not include the allegedly threatening
statements.
The indictment was sufficient because the
counts describe the elements of the
violation, the nature of the threat, the subject
of the threat, and the time period of the
alleged violation. For example, Count Four
alleged defendant communicated over the
internet on November 16, 2010 “a threat to
injure a kindergarten class.” If Elonis had
already been charged with this statement,
the indictment provided enough information
to challenge a subsequent prosecution.
Based on the indictment, defendant was
notified he needed to dispute that the
statement was a threat, that he
communicated the statement, and that he
transmitted the statement through interstate
commerce. Moreover, like the defendant
in Keys, Elonis was able to identify which
internet communications the indictment
described, since he did not raise the issue
until after trial.
C.
Elonis contends there was insufficient
evidence to convict on Counts 3 and 5 of the
indictment because the statements on which
they were based were not threats. “A claim
of insufficiency of evidence places a very
heavy burden on the appellant.” “[T]he
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relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
1.
Elonis contends Count 3 was based on a
conditional statement, which he asserts
cannot be a true threat. In Watts the
Supreme Court found the conditional nature
of defendant's statement to be one of the
three factors demonstrating it was not a true
threat. Elonis posted the following on his
Facebook page:

in Kosma. We found that Watts did not hold
conditional statements can never be true
threats. We explained the conditional
statements in Watts “were dependent on the
defendant's induction into the armed
forces—a condition which the defendant
stated would never happen.” Because the
defendant's threats in Kosma stated a precise
time and place for carrying out the alleged
threats, they were true threats.

***

Here the District Court found that a
reasonable jury could find the statement to
be a true threat. Unlike in Watts, Elonis did
not vow the condition precedent would
never occur. However, this case is also
unlike Kosma, where the statement included
a particular time and place. Elonis's
statement only conveys a vague timeline or
condition. But, taken as a whole, a jury
could have found defendant was threatening
to use explosives on officers who “[t]ry to
enforce an Order” of protection that was
granted to his wife. Since there is no rule
that a conditional statement cannot be a true
threat—the words and context can
demonstrate whether the statement was a
serious expression of intent to harm—and
we give substantial deference to a jury's
verdict, there was not insufficient evidence
for the jury to find the statement was a
threat.

And if worse comes to worse

2.

I've got enough explosives to take care of
the state police and the sheriff's
department

Defendant contends that the statement on
which Count 5 is based is a description of
past conduct, not a future intent to harm:

Fold up your PFA and put it in your
pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order
That was improperly granted in the first
place
Me thinks the judge needs an education
on true threat jurisprudence
And prison time will add zeroes to my
settlement
Which you won't see a lick
Because you suck dog dick in front of
children

[link:
Freedom
www.wikipedia.org]

of

Speech,

We considered the impact of conditional
statements on the true threat analysis

You know your shit's ridiculous when
you have the FBI knockin' at yo' door
Little Agent Lady stood so close
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Took all the strength I had not to turn the
bitch ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her
throat Leave her bleedin' from her jugular
in the arms of her partner
[laughter]
So the next time you knock, you best be
serving a warrant
And bring yo' SWAT and an explosives
expert while you're at it
Cause little did y'all know, I was strapped
wit' a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to
get dressed with no shoes on?
I was jus' waitin' for y'all to handcuff me
and pat me down
Touch the detonator in my pocket and
we're all goin'
[BOOM!]
A threat under § 875(c) is a communication
“expressing an intent to inflict injury in the
present or future.” It was possible for a
reasonable jury to conclude that the
statement “the next time you knock, best be
serving a warrant [a]nd bring yo' SWAT and
an explosives expert” coupled with the past
reference to a bomb was a threat to use
explosives against the agents “the next
time.” Indeed, the phrase “the next time”
refers to the future, not a past event.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have
found the statement was a true threat.
D.
Elonis contends the jury instruction stating
communications that travel over the internet
necessarily travel in interstate commerce
violated his due process rights because the

government was required to prove interstate
transmission as an element of the crime. The
District Court instructed the jury: “Because
of the interstate nature of the Internet, if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant
used
the
Internet
in
communicating a threat, then that
communication traveled in interstate
commerce.”
In United States v. MacEwan we explained
the
difference
between
interstate
transmission and interstate commerce. The
defendant
in MacEwan contended
the
government failed to prove he received child
pornography through interstate commerce
because a Comcast witness testified it was
impossible to know whether a particular
transmission traveled through computer
servers located entirely within Pennsylvania,
or to any other server in the United
States. “[W]e conclude[d] that because of
the very interstate nature of the Internet,
once a user submits a connection request to
a website server or an image is transmitted
from the website server back to [the] user,
the data has traveled in interstate
commerce.” “Having concluded that the
Internet is an instrumentality and channel of
interstate commerce.... [i]t is sufficient that
MacEwan downloaded those images from
the Internet, a system that is inexorably
intertwined with interstate commerce.”
Elonis distinguishes MacEwan by stating
that in that case the government presented
evidence on how the internet worked. But
the government's evidence in MacEwan did
not show that any one of the defendant's
internet transmissions traveled outside of
Pennsylvania. We found that fact to be
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irrelevant to the question of interstate
commerce because submitting data on the
internet necessarily means the data travels in
interstate commerce. Instead, we held “[i]t is
sufficient that [the defendant] downloaded
those images from the Internet.” Based on
our conclusion that proving internet
transmission alone is sufficient to prove
transmission through interstate commerce,

the District Court did not err in instructing
the jury.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons we will uphold
Elonis's convictions under 18 U.S.C. §
875(c).
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“On the Next Docket: How the First Amendment Applies to Social Media”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
June 30, 2014
Just four years ago, the Supreme Court
issued a hesitant and muddled decision in a
privacy case, saying it was best to move
slowly when ruling on an “emerging
technology before its role in society has
become clear.”
The cutting-edge innovation of the case:
pagers.
That decision, and the occasional oddball
question from the bench, earned the justices
a reputation as doddering technophobes.
But the final weeks of the court’s current
term left a different impression. In major
decisions on software patents, smartphones,
and Internet streaming, the justices seemed
savvy.
Now there is a new challenge looming on
the docket for the term that starts in October,
one that will require the court to consider
how the First Amendment applies to social
media.
The case concerns Anthony Elonis, who was
prosecuted for making threats on Facebook
in the form of rap lyrics after his wife left
him in 2010.
He vented his frustration using the nom de
rap Tone Dougie. His language was laced
with brutally violent images.
He suggested that his son might consider a
Halloween costume that included his
estranged wife’s “head on a stick.” He

talked about “making a name for myself”
with a school shooting, saying, “Hell hath
no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten
class.” He fantasized about killing an F.B.I.
agent.
His wife, Tara Elonis, understood the posts
as threats.
“I felt like I was being stalked,” she
testified. “I felt extremely afraid for mine
and my children’s and my family’s lives.”
But it is less clear that Mr. Elonis meant his
words that way. He said he was “just an
aspiring rapper,” and it is not hard to find
rap lyrics just as lurid and violent.
Several of the posts included disclaimers
and other indications that they were not in
earnest. He adapted one post almost
wholesale from a sketch by a comedy group,
The Whitest Kids U’ Know. The Halloween
post ended with an emoticon of a face with a
tongue sticking out.
“Art is about pushing the limits,” he wrote.
“I’m willing to go to jail for my
constitutional rights.”
Did his intent matter? The lower court said
no. All the prosecution had to prove, the trial
judge ruled, was that a “reasonable person”
would foresee that others would view his
statements “as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the
life of an individual.”
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The judge said that he did not mean to make
“something said in a joking manner or an
outburst of transitory anger” into a crime.
But almost anyone who has ever sent an
email knows how hard it is to detect those
things without the cues that body language
and tone of voice provide.
Mr. Elonis was convicted under a federal
law that makes it a crime to communicate
“any threat to injure the person of another.”
The sentence was 44 months.
The case is one of many recent prosecutions
“for alleged threats conveyed on new media,
including Facebook, YouTube and Twitter,”
according to a brief supporting Mr. Elonis
from several First Amendment groups.
In urging the Supreme Court not to hear Mr.
Elonis’s case, the Justice Department said
his intent should make no difference. A
perceived threat creates “fear and
disruption,” the brief said, “regardless of
whether the speaker subjectively intended
the statement to be innocuous.”
Mr. Elonis’s lawyers did not deny that their
approach would allow some statements with
“undesirable effects.” But they said the First

Amendment should tolerate those effects
rather than “imprisoning a person for
negligently misjudging how others would
construe his words.”
The First Amendment does not protect all
speech. There are exceptions for libel,
incitement, obscenity and fighting words,
and one for “true threats,” which is at issue
in Mr. Elonis’s case.
The Supreme Court has not given a
definitive answer to the question of whether
intent matters in threat cases. But in 1969 it
threw out a case against a draft protestor
charged with threatening President Lyndon
B. Johnson. “If they ever make me carry a
rifle,” the protestor said, “the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”
The remark was not a true threat, the court
ruled, because it was conditional, made at a
rally and greeted by laughter. But context is
harder to gauge online.
The case, Elonis v. United States, No. 13983, will be argued in the fall. It will again
require the justices to confront a new
technology and assess the meaning of the
First Amendment in the age of the emoticon.
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“Are Facebook Threats Real? The Supreme Court Will Soon Decide.”
Slate
Dahlia Lithwick
June 16, 2014
Monday morning the Supreme Court agreed
to hear an important First Amendment
challenge that will attempt to sort out—after
years of ambiguity and confusion in the
lower courts—when threats, specifically
Internet threats, should be taken seriously by
the law. The case will be heard in the term
that begins next October and will hopefully
clarify whether threats of violence made
over Facebook and other social media
should be judged by whether the threatening
speaker intended to harm anyone or whether
the listener was genuinely afraid of being
harmed. In light of the recent Isla Vista,
California, shooting and other acts of
violence that were telegraphed in social
media, the answer to that question could not
be more urgent.
So what do you do when you come across a
Facebook posting that reads:
That’s it, I’ve had about enough
I’m checking out and making a name for
myself
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile
radius
to initiate the most heinous school shooting
ever-imagined
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a
kindergarten-class
The only question is . . . which one?
Is that a threat to shoot up a school? Or just
some guy writing terrible rap lyrics?

Anthony Elonis, an eastern Pennsylvania
man, has served more than three years in
prison for posting threats on Facebook.
After his wife took their two kids and left
him in 2010, he got fired from his job. He
then began a series of dark and vengeful
rants, sometimes in the form of rap lyrics
like the above, about threats to kill his wife,
a female FBI agent, and a class of
kindergartners. Elonis contends that these
weren’t ever real threats—that they were
“therapeutic” and that these words are
protected First Amendment speech. He
claims that the lyrics were not intended as
warnings of real violence and that they were
a harmless way to express his severe
depression and frustration after his wife left.
In one post, Elonis wrote about smothering
his wife with a pillow and dumping her body
in a creek so it would look like a rape. In
another he wrote: “There’s one way to love
you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not
going to rest until your body is a mess,
soaked in blood and dying from all the little
cuts. Hurry up and die, bitch, so I can bust
this nut all over your corpse from atop your
shallow grave. I used to be a nice guy but
then you became a slut. Guess it’s not your
fault you liked your daddy raped you. So
hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive
you.”
Elonis wrote about smothering his wife and
dumping her body in a creek but contends
these weren’t ever real threats.
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After an FBI agent visited him to follow up
on the earlier threats, Elonis posted a rap
about slitting her throat and claimed he’d
had a bomb strapped to him throughout the
interview. He was arrested in December
2010 and tried before a jury under a federal
law that prohibits the use of interstate
communications of threats to harm
individuals. His wife testified that she was
objectively terrified by the posts, especially
since they increased after she filed a
“protection from abuse” order against him.
“I felt like I was being stalked. I felt
extremely afraid for mine and my children’s
and my families’ lives,” she said at the trial.
She also testified that Elonis rarely listened
to rap music and that she had never seen him
write rap lyrics over the course of their
seven-year marriage.
Elonis was convicted on four of the five
federal charges and sentenced to 44 months
in jail.
The case deals with an area of First
Amendment law known as “true threats.”
These kinds of threats are unprotected under
the First Amendment. The trick is figuring
out whether Elonis’ speech was a true threat
or not. At his trial, the jury was told that the
legal standard for whether something is an
unprotected “true threat” is if an objective
person could consider Elonis’ posts to be
threatening. Elonis claims that the correct
test should look at whether he intended for
the posts to be understood as threats. He also
argues that his rap lyrics are important
protected speech, no different from the rap
lyrics created by the great artists. In his view
the threatening and violent lyrics he was
posting were emulating those of Eminem.

(Elonis was careful to include some
disclaimers among his writings, suggesting
that this was all more art than threat, and
also an act of First Amendment protest: “Art
is about pushing limits,” he posted. “I’m
willing to go to jail for my constitutional
rights. Are you?”)
The last time the high court scrutinized the
“true threat” doctrine was in 2003, when it
found that a Virginia law banning cross
burning was unconstitutional because a “true
threat” requires the speaker to communicate
an intent to commit violence. (Justice
Clarence Thomas was the lone dissenter.) In
that case, the court defined true threats as
“statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of
individuals.” Elonis read the Virginia case to
say that the definition of true threats means
that the speaker must truly intend to threaten
the victim.
Courts across the country have been split on
whether the subjective intent of the speaker
or the objective assessment of the listener is
what matters when it comes to discerning a
true threat. The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals,
looking at the facts in Elonis’ case, held that
if a statement causes a reasonable person to
fear for her safety, that’s a true threat. Most
other courts agree on that standard: a
reasonable person’s objective interpretation
controls the outcome. The 9th Circuit on the
other hand has taken the position that the
speaker must have intended to communicate
threat and “intend for his language to
threaten the victim.” The Justice Department
supports the 3rd Circuit’s test, arguing that
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the law must not only prevent real violence
but also deter real fear.
One of the confounding factors here is that
the court hasn’t yet looked at the question of
true threats through the lens of modern
technology. Those urging the court to take
the case argued that speeches at rallies and
even cross burnings are fundamentally
different from YouTube postings or tweets.
Elonis claims that you can’t use an objective
listener standard when you are dealing with
the
interpersonal
and
context-free
conversation that takes place in the Wild
West of social media. Elonis’ petition for
Supreme Court review argues that “modern
media allow personal reflections intended
for a small audience (or no audience) to be
viewed widely by people who are unfamiliar
with the context in which the statements
were made and thus who may interpret the
statements much differently than the
speakers intended.”
In a column about the high stakes in this
case, three law professors writing in support
of Elonis explain that “information posted to
social media sites is often disseminated and
displayed in ways that users do not control
or
even
understand,
profoundly
complicating attempts to determine a
person’s intent in posting something or a
‘reasonable’ person’s interpretation of
it. Context becomes further complicated
when a so-called threat is a lyric from a
musical genre that often privileges highly
exaggerated, confrontational and violent
rhetoric.”

Internet, the recipient is not the issue
anymore; that, unlike a letter, posts on social
media may simply be left for anyone to find.
In an interview with a Pennsylvania paper,
Richards explained that people use social
media “to say all kinds of things but they
may not be directing it to a particular
individual. They’re just venting their
feelings.”
This case is not only crucially important in
that it will force the court to clarify its own
“true threats” doctrine and finally apply it to
social media to determine whether—
as Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested—
the whole world is a crowded theater. But
perhaps it’s even more important in pushing
the conversation about law enforcement,
prosecution, and threats to include a much
more sophisticated understanding of the
ways in which the Internet is not just a rally
or a letter. As Amanda Hess has explained
so powerfully, women experience threats on
social media in ways that can have crippling
economic and psychological effects. At the
margins, this is a case about the line
between first amendment performance art,
fantasy violence, real threats—and real fear.
In a world in which men and women find it
nearly impossible to agree on what’s an idle
threat and what’s a legitimate one, it’s also a
case about where that line lies, or whether
there can be one.

Robert
Richards,
director
of
the
Pennsylvania Center for the First
Amendment at Penn State, argues that on the
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“True Threats”
First Amendment Center
David L. Hudson Jr.
May 12, 2008
The First Amendment protects a wide swath
of expression that many of us may find
offensive, distasteful or even repugnant. The
government cannot silence and punish
speakers just because it dislikes their
expression.
Oftentimes,
the
First
Amendment protects the flag-burner, the
tobacco advertiser, the pornographer and the
hateful speaker.
However, First Amendment jurisprudence
has never provided absolute protection to all
forms of speech. There are several
unprotected categories of expression,
including but not limited to fighting words,
obscenity, extortion, perjury and false
advertising. Another unprotected category is
the true threat. The First Amendment does
not give a person the right to walk up to
someone else and say “I am going to kill
you” or to announce in an airport, “I am
going to bomb this plane.”
Yet the line between protected expression
and an unprotected true threat is often hazy
and uncertain. What if a speaker makes a
seemingly threatening statement about a
political figure through the use of
hyperbole? What if a student says that if he
receives a poor grade, he may “go
Columbine”? What if an abortion protester
talks about participating in a “war against
abortionists”?

The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed a
true-threat case in Watts v. United
States (1969). Robert Watts, a young
African-American man, allegedly stated
during a protest in Washington D.C.:
“They always holler at us to get an
education. And now I have already
received my draft classification as 1-A
and I have got to report for my physical
this Monday morning. I am not going. If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.
They are not going to make me kill my
black brothers.”
Prosecutors charged Watts with violating a
federal law that prohibits threats against the
president. Watts countered that his statement
was a form of crude political opposition. A
federal jury convicted Watts of a felony for
violating the law and a federal appeals court
affirmed his conviction. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Watts’
statement was political hyperbole rather than
a true threat.
“We agree with [Watts] that his only offense
here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive
method of stating a political opposition to
the President,’” the Court wrote in a per
curiam opinion. “Taken in context, and
regarding the expressly conditional nature of
the statement and the reaction of the
listeners, we do not see how it could be
interpreted otherwise.”

Supreme Court case law
Unfortunately, the Court in Watts failed to
define what constitutes a true threat. Other
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courts considering true-threats cases have
focused
on
certain
elements
ofWatts, including: (1) the fact that the
comments were made accompanying a
political debate; (2) the conditional nature of
the threat; and (3) the context of the speech,
as apparently several listeners laughed after
Watts spoke.
The Supreme Court next addressed true
threats, though not directly, in another case
with connections to the civil rights
movement. In NAACP. v. Claiborne
Hardware (1982), the Court unanimously
reversed a finding that Charles Evers and the
NAACP could be found civilly liable for
speech advocating the boycott of certain
white-owned businesses. Evers, field
secretary for the NAACP in Mississippi, had
given impassioned speeches encouraging
fellow African-Americans to participate in
the boycott. He made some highly charged
statements, such as “If we catch any of you
going in any of them racist stores, we’re
gonna break your damn neck.”
The Court found that Evers’ comments did
not constitute fighting words, incitement to
imminent lawless action or a true threat. It
concluded that “Evers’ addresses did not
exceed the bounds of protected speech.”
While most of the analysis centered on
whether Evers’ speech incited imminent
lawless action, the case added to
the Watts legacy that charged political
advocacy is unlikely to rise to the level of a
true threat. Unfortunately, it provided little
guidance for determining whether speech
constitutes a true threat.
“Claiborne Hardware is one of the most
difficult cases to analyze,” wrote Stanford

Law Professor Jennifer Rothman in her
incisive 2001 article, “Freedom of Speech
and True Threats” for the Harvard Journal
of Law and Public Policy. “The decision
itself is fairly opaque about its basis for
determining that Evers’ speech did not
constitute true threats.”
The high court more directly addressed true
threats in a pair of Virginia cross-burning
cases collectively known as Virginia v.
Black (2003). One case involved a Ku Klux
Klan leader named Barry Elton Black, who
burned a cross in a field with the permission
of the property owner. The other case
involved two individuals who burned
crosses in the yard of a neighboring AfricanAmerican family. In separate cases that
became consolidated, the Supreme Court
examined the constitutionality of a Virginia
state law that prohibited “any person or
group of persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons,
to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other
public place.”
Another provision of the law created a
presumption that all cross-burnings were
done with an intent to intimidate. In its
decision, the Court upheld the bulk of the
Virginia law, but invalidated the section that
provided that all cross-burnings were
presumed to be intimidating.
In deciding the case, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor in her plurality opinion offered a
definition of true threats:
“‘True
threats’
encompass
those
statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful
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violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat.
Rather, a prohibition on true threats
protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence and from the disruption that fear
engenders, in addition to protecting
people from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.”
She
added,
“intimidation
in
the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker
directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim
in fear of bodily harm or death.”
Lack of clarity
Many legal experts say that the Supreme
Court’s true-threat cases have failed to
provide clear guidance for lower courts.
Commentator Paul T. Crane in a
2006 Virginia Law Review article “True
Threats and the Issue of Intent,” wrote that
“in providing a definition, the Court created
more confusion than elucidation” and
“spawned as many questions as answers.”
Duke law professor Steven Gey, in a 2005
article for the Notre Dame Law Review, “A
Few Questions About Cross Burning,
Intimidation and Free Speech,” said:
“Justice O’Connor’s opinion in the cross
burning case borders on the incoherent.”
Many lower courts have struggled with the
Court’s decision in Black because it is
unclear what level of intent is necessary for
a speaker’s utterance to be considered a true
threat. In other words, must a speaker
subjectively intend to intimidate or threaten
others? Or is it sufficient if the speaker
makes a comment that a recipient reasonably

believes is a threat? Should true threats be
interpreted under a “reasonable speaker” or
“reasonable recipient” standard? Is there a
difference between a true threat and
intimidation or is intimidation a special
subset of the more general category of true
threats?
Lower courts struggle to define true threats
and apply the Court’s precedents
from Watts and Black. Some courts have
determined that in order for speech to
constitute a true threat, the speaker must
subjectively intend to threaten someone.
This doesn’t mean that the speaker must
actually intend to carry out the threat. It does
mean, however, that the speaker must
subjectively intend that his or her comments
be interpreted as a true threat.
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted this view in
United States v. Cassel (2005), a case
involving a man who allegedly intimidated
prospective buyers to dissuade them from
purchasing a plot of land next to his own.
Jury instructions in his case provided:
“Intimidation is to make a person timid or
fearful through the use of words and conduct
that would put an ordinary, reasonable
person in fear or apprehension for the
purpose of compelling or deterring legal
conduct of that person.”
For the 9th Circuit, the jury instructions
were constitutionally deficient because they
did not require the government to prove that
the defendant made the comments with the
intent to intimidate the prospective buyers.
However, other courts interpret Virginia v.
Black as requiring only that the speaker
knowingly intended to communicate to
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another person. These courts do not require
that it be proven that the speaker
subjectively intended to threaten someone.
Rather, they focus on whether there was an
intent to communicate and whether an
objective or reasonable recipient would
regard it as a serious expression of harm.
For example, a three-judge panel of the 5th
Circuit in Porter v. Ascension School
District (2004) wrote:
“Speech is a true threat and therefore
unprotected if an objectively reasonable
person would interpret the speech as a
serious expression of an intent to cause a
present or future harm. The protected
status of the threatening speech is not
determined by whether the speaker had
the subjective intent to carry out the
threat; rather, to lose the protection of the
First Amendment and be lawfully
punished, the threat must be intentionally
or knowingly communicated to either the
object of the threat or a third person.”
Even courts that agree there is no subjectiveintent requirement disagree over how to
apply the objective requirement. Courts
disagree whether the objective test should be
applied from the perspective of a reasonable
speaker (the person allegedly making the
threat or who should have known that his
words could be interpreted as threatening) or
the reasonable recipient (the intended
target). Some courts avoid the labeling of
reasonable speaker or recipient and simply
apply a reasonable-person standard.
Still other courts employ a multi-factor test
to determine whether speech constitutes a
true
threat.
In United
States
v.
Dinwiddie (1996), the 8th Circuit examined
whether an abortion protester engaged in
making true threats in violation of the

Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act
(FACE). The court applied a test consisting
of what came to be known as the
“Dinwiddie factors”:


The reaction of the recipient of the
threat and of other listeners.



Whether the threat was conditional.



Whether
the
threat
was
communicated directly to its victim.



Whether the maker of the threat had
made similar statements to the victim
in the past.



Whether the victim had reason to
believe that the maker of the threat
had a propensity to engage in
violence.

Conclusion
True-threat jurisprudence remains a
muddled mess. Courts often have trouble
determining whether violent expression
should be evaluated under the “incitement to
imminent lawless action” standard or under
a true-threats line of analysis.
In a high-profile case involving a Web site
known as the Nuremberg Files, which listed
abortion providers with lines drawn through
names if they were killed, a three-judge
panel of the 9th Circuit said Brandenburg v.
Ohio (1969) and its requirement of
imminency must be applied. That is, a threat
must be explicit and likely to cause
“imminent lawless action.” The panel ruled
that neither was the case and that the speech
on the Web site was protected. But, the full
panel of the 9th Circuit eventually ruled 6-5
that the case was more properly evaluated
under true-threat analysis and that the Web
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site did in fact constitute a true threat. In
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review this ruling.
Lower courts are far from consistent in how
they determine whether speech is truly
threatening. Some courts interpret Supreme
Court case law to require subjective intent,
while others apply different versions of an
“objective” test as some form of general
intent to communicate.

The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into
the thickets of true threats in Virginia v.
Black seemingly raises as many questions as
it provides answers. Particularly interesting
will be whether intimidation becomes a
synonym for, or a subset of, true threats. It
may take further clarification from the
Supreme Court to resolve these thorny
questions and provide more guidance on
when speech crosses the line from protected
speech into unprotected threats or
intimidation.
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“3rd Cir. Re-Examines 1st Amendment True Threat Exception”
Find Law
Gabriella Khorasanee
September 27, 2013
People get carried away on Facebook. But
when is a rant no longer a rant?
The Third Circuit re-examined its First
Amendment jurisprudence to redefine the
boundaries of true threats and came to a
reasonable conclusion: Objective intent is
enough (pun intended).
Facebook Threats
Anthony Elonis was estranged from his
wife, and as a result of his depression and
inappropriate behavior was fired from his
job. What followed was a campaign of
Facebook rants that included references
including, but not limited to, his estranged
wife's "head on a stick," an elementary
school shooting, detonating explosives, and
killing his wife, cops, kids, co-workers,
along with FBI agents. Violent enough for
you? (For your daily dose of the disturbing
and crazy, read the full opinion).
Elonis didn't think so, but a jury did; he was
convicted on four of the five counts brought
against him for violations of 18 U.S.C. §
875(c), which prohibits the use of interstate
communications of threats to harm
individuals. His prior attempt to dismiss the
indictment failed, as well as several postconviction motions.
On appeal, Elonis' main argument was
whether the true threats exception to First
Amendment speech protection requires an
objective or subjective intent to threat.

True Threat Jurisprudence
In 1991, the Third Circuit in United States v.
Korma held that an objective standard
applied to determine whether a statement
was a true threat -- that is, "a statement is a
true threat when a reasonable speaker would
foresee the statement would be interpreted
as a threat." Elonis argued that the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Virginia v.
Black required a subjective intent to
threaten.
In Virginia v. Black, the Court reviewed a
statute that prohibited the burning of crosses
intended to intimidate and defined crossburning as prima facie evidence of intention
to intimidate. The Supreme Court held that
cross-burning could be prohibited, but the
language of the statute failed on due process
grounds because the prima facie evidence
clause denied a defendants' "right to not put
on a defense."
Circuit Split
The Third Circuit declined to accept Elonis'
interpretation, in accord with the
Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits. The Third
Circuit found that the Black case turned on
the prima facie evidence exception, which
was not present here. Instead, here, the court
found that the context of the statements was
taken into account, and the Government still
had to "prove that a reasonable person
would foresee Elonis's statements would be
understood as threats." The Third Circuit
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declined
to
accept
the Ninth
Circuit's reading of Black, which would
require the speaker to intend to both
communicate and threaten.
The Supreme Court has not taken on many
true threat cases, but seeing that the circuits

have been in disagreement for several years,
and that there is only one circuit with a
differing interpretation, it may take more
division among the circuits for the High
Court to clarify the true threat exception.
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Holt v. Hobbs
13-6827
Ruling Below: Gregory Houston Holt v. Ray Hobbs, 509 Fed.Appx. 561 (Mem) (8th Cir. 2013),
cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 1490 (2014).
Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) grooming policy
violates his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). Mr. Muhammad is a Salafi Muslim who seeks to grow a beard in observance of his
religion but in contravention to the ADC grooming policy, which only allows beard growth up to
a quarter inch for inmates with diagnosed dermatological problems.
Question Presented: Whether the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violates
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U. S. C. § 2000cc et seq.,
to the extent that it prohibits petitioner from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with
his religious beliefs.

Gregory Houston Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Gaylon Lay, Warden,
Cummins Unit, ADC; D W Tate, Captain, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of
Correction; V. R. Robertson, Major, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of
Correction; M. Richardson, Sgt., Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of
Correction; Larry May, Chief Deputy Director, Arkansas Department of Correction,
Defendants – Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Decided on June 12, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM
In this action challenging the Arkansas
Department of Correction (ADC) grooming
policy under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
inmate Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul
Maalik Muhammad) appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his action after an
evidentiary hearing.

In his complaint and motion for a
preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, Mr. Holt asserted that one
of his fundamentalist Muslim beliefs was
that he must grow a beard, but defendants
substantially burdened his ability to practice
his religion by enforcing ADC’s grooming
policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches
but otherwise no facial hair, with quarter411

inch beards permitted only for a diagnosed
dermatological problem. Mr. Holt sought
permission to maintain a half-inch beard as a
compromise position, to balance his
religious beliefs with ADC’s security needs.
The district court initially granted temporary
injunctive relief. The court vacated its order
and dismissed the complaint, however, after
the hearing produced evidence that Mr. Holt
had a prayer rug and a list of distributors of
Islamic material, he was allowed to
correspond with a religious advisor, and he
was allowed to maintain the required diet
and observe religious holidays; that the
grooming policy helped prevent inmates
from concealing contraband, drugs, or
weapons; that an inmate who grew a beard
could change his appearance quickly by
shaving; that affording special privileges to
an individual inmate could result in his

being targeted by other inmates; and that
prison officials believed the grooming
policy was necessary to further ADC’s
interest in prison security.
Following careful review, we conclude that
defendants met their burden under RLUIPA
of establishing that ADC’s grooming policy
was the least restrictive means of furthering
a
compelling
penological
interest,
notwithstanding Mr. Holt’s citation to cases
indicating that prisons in other jurisdictions
have been able to meet their security needs
while allowing inmates to maintain facial
hair.
Accordingly, we affirm, but we modify the
judgment to reflect that the dismissal does
not count as a “strike” for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Weigh an Inmate’s Right to Grow a Beard for
Religious Reasons”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
March 3, 2014
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
decide whether prison officials in Arkansas
may prohibit inmates from growing beards
in accordance with their religious beliefs.
The policy was challenged by Gregory H.
Holt, who is serving a life sentence for
burglary and domestic battery. Mr. Holt said
his Muslim faith required him to grow a
beard.
The state’s policy allows trimmed
mustaches, along with quarter-inch beards
for those with dermatologic problems.
Prison officials said the ban on other facial
hair was needed to promote “health and
hygiene,” to minimize “opportunities for
disguise” and to help prevent the
concealment of contraband.
Mr. Holt sued under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, a federal
law that requires prison officials to show
that policies that burden religious practices
advance a compelling penological interest
and use the least restrictive means to do so.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis, ruled in June
that the justifications offered by the officials
satisfied that standard.

Mr. Holt filed a handwritten petition in
September asking the justices to hear his
case, Holt v. Hobbs, No. 13-6827, pointing
out that other courts had struck down
policies banning beards in prisons. In an
interim order in November, the Supreme
Court ordered that Mr. Holt be allowed to
grow a half-inch beard.
In their response to Mr. Holt’s Supreme
Court petition, prison officials told the
justices that “homemade darts and other
weapons” and “cellphone SIM cards” could
be concealed in even half-inch beards. They
added that they did not welcome the task of
monitoring the lengths of inmates’ beards.
In a reply brief, Mr. Holt, now represented
by Douglas Laycock, a law professor at the
University of Virginia, said 39 state
corrections systems and the federal system
allow prisoners to grow beards. He added
that the justifications for the policy were
illogical as there were easier places to hide
contraband — shoes, say — than in a short
beard.
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“U.S. Justices Say Inmate Can Keep Beard While Contesting Policy”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
November 14, 2013
The Supreme Court on Thursday said an
Arkansas prison inmate should be allowed to
maintain a beard while he contests the
prison's grooming policy.
In an unusual order, the court said that
Gregory Holt, 38, should be allowed to grow
a beard of up to one-half of an inch in length
in accordance with his Muslim beliefs.
The court was responding to a handwritten
request filed by Holt, who recounted his

lengthy and unsuccessful attempt to fight the
grooming policy.
Holt is serving a life sentence for burglary
and domestic battery at the Varner
Supermax prison, according to the Arkansas
Department of Correction's website.
The Supreme Court's order said Holt could
keep his beard while he files a petition with
the court seeking review of a June appeals
court decision that went against him.
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Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona
13-502
Ruling Below: Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013), cert granted,
134 S.Ct. 2900 (2014).
Church and pastor seeking to place temporary signs announcing services filed suit claiming that
town's sign ordinance, restricting size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs,
violated right to free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona denied church's motion for preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of ordinance. Church appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
remanded in part. On remand, the District Court granted town summary judgment. Church and
pastor appealed.
Question Presented: Whether the Town of Gilbert's mere assertion that its sign code lacks a
discriminatory motive renders its facially content-based sign code content-neutral and justifies
the code's differential treatment of petitioners' religious signs.

Clyde REED, Pastor and Good News Community Church, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA and Adam Adams, in his official capacity as Code
Compliance Manager, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on February 8, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Good News Community Church and its
pastor, Clyde Reed (referred to collectively
as “Good News”), appeal from the district
court's determination on remand from the
Ninth Circuit that the Town of Gilbert's
ordinance that restricts the size, duration and
location of temporary directional signs does
not discriminate between different forms of
noncommercial speech in a unconstitutional
manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert (9th Cir.
2009), we held that the ordinance
(sometimes referred to as the “Sign Code”)

is not a content-based regulation and is a
reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. However, we remanded the case
to the district court “to consider the First
Amendment and Equal Protection claims
that the Sign Code is unconstitutional in
favoring some noncommercial speech over
other noncommercial speech.”
Accepting our opinion in Reed as law of the
case, we conclude that the Sign Code is
constitutional
because
the
different
treatment of types of noncommercial
temporary signs are not content-based as
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that term is defined in Reed, and the
restrictions are tailored to serve significant
governmental interests. In addition, we
determine that the amendments to the Sign
Code made by the Town of Gilbert
(“Gilbert”) during the pendency of this
appeal do not moot this case and that Good
News may file a new action in the district
court should it wish to challenge the new
provisions of the Sign Code.
I.
Good News is a relatively small church with
25 to 30 adult members and 4 to 10 children.
“Members of Good News believe the Bible
commands them to go and make disciples of
all nations, and that they should carry out
this command by reaching out to the
community to meet together on a regular
basis. To do so, they display signs
announcing their services as an invitation for
those in the community to attend.” Starting
around 2002, Good News met at an
elementary school in Gilbert. It presently
rents space at an elementary school in
Chandler, Arizona, which borders Gilbert.
For a time, Good News placed about 17
signs in the area surrounding its place of
worship in Gilbert announcing the time and
location of its services. In 2005, Good News
received an advisory notice from Gilbert that
it was violating the town's sign ordinance
because “the signs were displayed outside
the statutorily-limited time period.” For a
while thereafter, Good News reduced the
number of signs it erected and the amount of
time its signs were in place, but friction with
Gilbert persisted. In March 2008, Good
News filed suit in federal court in Arizona
alleging that Gilbert's Sign Code violated

the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Sign Ordinances
Like many municipalities, Gilbert regulates
the display of outdoor signs. Section
4.401(A) outlines the purposes for the Sign
Code, namely, to “assure proper and
efficient
expression
through
visual
communications involving signs compatible
with the character and environment of the
Town; to eliminate confusing, distracting,
and unsafe signs; and to enhance the visual
environment of the Town of Gilbert.”
Under § 4.402(A), no person may erect a
sign without first obtaining a sign permit,
unless the sign is one exempted under §
4.402(D). Section 4.402(D) lists nineteen
different types of signs that are allowed
without a permit. Three of the types of
exempted signs are of particular relevance:
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to
Qualifying Event,” “Political Signs,” and
“Ideological Signs.”
Gilbert asserts, and Good News concedes,
that Good News' signs are Temporary
Directional
Signs
subject
to
the
requirements of § 4.402(P). This subsection
provides that “Temporary Directional Signs
Relating to a Qualifying Event ... shall be no
greater than 6 feet in height and 6 square
feet in area,” “shall only be displayed up to
12 hours before, during and 1 hour after the
qualifying event ends,” “may be located offsite and shall be placed at grade level,” and
“shall be placed only with the permission of
the owner of the property on which they are
placed.” Additional restrictions include that
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“[n]o more that 4 signs shall be displayed on
a single property at any one time,” and that
Temporary Directional Signs may not be
placed “in a public right-of-way” or on
“fences, boulders, planters, other signs,
vehicles, utility facilities, or any structure.”
A “Political Sign” is defined as a
“temporary sign which supports candidates
for office or urges action on any other matter
on the ballot of primary, general and special
elections.” Political Signs (a) may be up to
32 square feet in size, (b) may be erected
any time prior to an election but must be
taken down within 10 days of the election,
(c) are not limited in number, and (d) may
be placed in the public right-of-way. An
“Ideological Sign” is a “sign communicating
a message or ideas for noncommercial
purposes that is not a construction sign,
directional sign, temporary directional sign,
temporary directional sign relating to a
qualified event, political sign, garage sale
sign, or sign owned or required by a
governmental agency.” Ideological Signs (a)
may be up to 20 square feet in size, (b) are
not limited in time, (c) are not limited in
number, and (d) may be placed in the public
right-of-way.
B. Initial Proceedings in the District
Court
Gilbert initially stipulated to a preliminary
injunction, but when Gilbert amended the
Sign Code in a way that Good News
believed continued to infringe on its
constitutional rights, Good News filed a
second motion for a preliminary injunction.
In September 2008, the district court denied
Good News' motion for an injunction,
concluding that: (a) “§ 4.402(P) is a content-

neutral regulation, and [ ] it passes the
applicable intermediate level of scrutiny;”
and (b) the Sign Code “does not violate
equal protection, as any uneven effects are
an unintended consequence of the lawful
content-neutral regulation.” Good News
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
C. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2009)
In November 2009 we basically affirmed the
district court's denial of an injunction. In
doing so, we made four determinations that
guide our review in this appeal.
1. Good News alleges an
challenge to the Sign Code

as-applied

First, we held that Good News' challenge
was an as-applied challenge, and not a facial
challenge, to the Sign Code. We determined
that Good News' attack on the ordinance
was “basically a challenge to the ordinance
as applied to [its] activities,” and therefore
we limited our analysis of the
constitutionality of the ordinance to its
application to Good News.
2. The Sign Code is not a content-based
regulation
Second, after reviewing the evolution of our
opinions from Foti v. City of Menlo Park
to Menotti v. City of Seattle and G.K.
Limited Travel v. City of Lake Oswego
(“G.K. Ltd.”), we determined the fact that an
enforcement official had to read a sign did
not mean that a ordinance is content-based.
Instead, we concluded that “our focus
should be on determining whether the
ordinance targets certain content; whether
the ordinance or exemption is based on
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identification of a speaker or event instead
of on content; and whether an enforcement
officer would need to distinguish content to
determine applicability of the ordinance.”
Applying this focus to the Sign Code, we
found that the ordinance “regulates physical
characteristics, such as size, number and
construction of the signs,” their locations,
and the timing of displays, none of which
“implicate the content of speech.” We noted
that “[t]he definition of a Qualifying Event
sign merely encompasses the elements of
‘who’ is speaking and ‘what event’ is
occurring.” These two criteria invoke the
speaker-based
and
event-based
characteristics
approved
in G.K.
Ltd. because “the City d[id] not limit the
substance of [the] speech in any way.” We
explained that this case:
highlights the absurdity of construing the
“officer must read it” test as a bellwether
of content. If applied without common
sense, this principle would mean that
every sign, except a blank sign, would be
content based. While a Gilbert officer
needs to briefly take in what is written on
the Qualifying Event Sign to note who is
speaking and the timing of the listed
event, this “kind of cursory examination”
is not akin to an officer synthesizing the
expressive content of the sign.
We concluded “that § 4.402(P) is not a
content-based regulation: It does not single
out certain content for differential treatment,
and in enforcing the provision an officer
must merely note the content-neutral
elements of who is speaking through the
sign and whether and when an event is
occurring.”

3. The Sign Code is narrowly tailored to
further Gilbert's significant interests
Third, we determined that the Sign Code,
“as a content-neutral time, place and manner
regulation,” also had to be, and was,
narrowly tailored. Quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, we recognized that to be
“narrowly tailored” the Sign Code had to
“serve a significant governmental interest”
and had to “leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of that
information.” We held that the district court
had not abused its discretion in concluding
that the Sign Code “is narrowly tailored as it
does not sweep in more speech than is
necessary to achieve the Town's aesthetic
and traffic objectives,” explaining:
The restrictions on time, place and
manner imposed by Gilbert on the
display of Qualifying Events Signs would
indeed appear to “actually advance” the
aesthetic and safety interests by limiting
the size, duration and proliferation of
signs. These measures restricting the
number of signs and limiting them to
private property do not appear
substantially broader measures than
required to make sure the rights-of-way
are not so thicketed with signs as to pose
a safety hazard or create an aesthetic
blight. The limitation on timing—twelve
hours before the event and one hour
after—is equally narrowly tailored to
meet these interests. While it might be
easier and provide broader exposure for
Good News to have the sign up for
twenty-four hours, the test is not
convenience or optimal display.
We also held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the Sign
Code allowed for alternate channels of
communications for Good News to
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communicate effectively with members of
the public. We explained that “[w]hile the
alternative options identified by the district
court may not be Good News' preference,
‘we cannot invalidate the Sign Code merely
because it restricts plaintiffs' preferred
method of communication.’ ” We also noted
that the alternative modes available did not
appear to be especially burdensome.
This section of Reed concludes with the
affirmative statement that:
Section 4.402(P) is a content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner
of display of Good News' Qualifying
Event Signs; the provision is narrowly
tailored to further Gilbert's significant
interests in aesthetics and traffic safety;
and Good News has ample alternative
channels of communicating its invitation
to church services.
4. The Sign Code does not favor
commercial over noncommercial speech
The fourth relevant holding in Reed is our
determination that the district court “did not
abuse its discretion in concluding, after
close examination, that the Sign Code does
not favor commercial speech over noncommercial speech.” Our opinion in Reed
remanded on a limited issue only: “to
consider the First Amendment and Equal
Protection claims that the Sign Code is
unconstitutional
in
favoring
some
noncommercial
speech
over
other
noncommercial speech.” We noted that
“[o]n remand, the district court will have the
opportunity to determine whether Gilbert
impermissibly ‘evaluate[d] the strength of,
or
distinguished
between,
various
[noncommercial] communicative interests.’”

D. Proceedings on Remand in the District
Court
On remand, the parties agreed to submit the
case on cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court's order set forth
three preliminary determinations. First,
based in part on our opinion in Reed, the
court held that the Sign Code “is a contentneutral regulation of speech that seeks to
identify who is speaking and what event is
occurring and does not discriminate on the
basis of content.” Second, citing its
preliminary injunction order, the district
court reiterated that the Sign Code was
narrowly tailored to serve significant
government interests. Third, the court
embraced as a non-preliminary finding its
determination that noncommercial speech is
more favorably treated than commercial
speech.
Addressing the remanded issue, the district
court thought that the different treatments of
various forms of noncommercial speech
were “akin to the regulation at issue in G.K.
Ltd.” The district court reasoned:
Both Political Signs and Qualifying
Event Signs relate, in substance, to
events—an election or a specified event
fitting the definition in the Sign Code. In
the case of Political Signs, the event is
of widespread interest and takes place at
a fixed, regular interval. A Qualified
Event might take place once, or it might
take place several times a week,
depending on the type of event. A
Qualifying Event Sign could invoke socalled “core” speech, but Political Signs
are always core speech.... To distinguish
between a Political Sign and a
Qualifying Event Sign, an officer need
only skim the sign to determine the
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speaker (e.g. is a non-profit speaking?)
and the event at issue (e.g. does this
relate to an election or a Qualifying
Event?).
In G.K.
Ltd., the
court
concluded that speaker—and—event
based exemptions did not render a sign
regulation content-based because the
municipality was distinguishing on the
basis of the speaker's identity and
whether a triggering event had
occurred, not on the basis of the sign's
content.
....
Ideological Signs are not tied to a
specific event, the way Political and
Qualifying Event Signs are, so they are
not subject to an event-based time
restriction under the Sign Code. This
accounts for the different “time”
restriction for Ideological Signs. As for
place, namely whether a particular type
of sign can be placed in the right-of-way,
Gilbert argues that it has made a
municipal decision to limit the overall
number of signs in the right-of-way, and
it does not discriminate at all among
Ideological Signs.... Nonetheless, the
Court finds that the Sign Code does not
distinguish on the basis of the message of
the sign because, other than signs relating
to events—whether those events are
elections or bake sales—the Sign Code
treats all messages on equal footing.
Because Ideological Signs do not relate
to an event, they are distinguishable from
Qualifying Event Signs. To determine
whether a sign is an Ideological Sign or a
Qualifying Event Sign, an officer does
not need to read the content: he or she
need only look to see whether the sign
concerns an event.
After determining that the Sign Code did not
discriminate among types of noncommercial
speech, the district court rejected Good

News' argument that the Sign Code was
impermissibly vague and overbroad.
Citing United States v. Williams, the district
court commented that the “[v]agueness
doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First
Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,” and that a statute
is void if it does not “provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or is so standardless that it
authorizes
or
encourages
seriously
discriminatory enforcement.” The district
court determined that the deterrent effect of
the Sign Code was “insubstantial and
remote” as the “ordinance provides plenty of
guidance for people of ordinary intelligence
to determine what conduct is permitted and
prohibited, and does not foster arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory enforcement.”
E. Gilbert's Motion to Dismiss
Good News filed this appeal from the
district court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of Gilbert. However, in October
2011, while the appeal was pending, Gilbert
made two amendments to its Sign Code: (1)
it allowed placement of Temporary
Directional Signs within the public right-ofway; and (2) it limited the Temporary
Directional Sign exemption to events held
within the Town of Gilbert. Based on the
amended Sign Code, Gilbert filed a motion
to dismiss this appeal, arguing that because
Good News held its services outside of
Gilbert, it does not qualify for the
Temporary Directional Sign exemption, and
lacks standing to pursue this appeal.
The motion to dismiss presents a situation
analogous to that before the Supreme Court
in Northeastern Florida Chapter of
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Associated General Contractors of America
v. City of Jacksonville. In Northeastern
Florida, the plaintiffs challenged a city
ordinance providing preferential treatment to
certain minority owned businesses for city
contracts. The district court granted the
plaintiffs summary judgment, holding that
the ordinance was unconstitutional, but the
Eleventh Circuit vacated that order finding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Shortly
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
the city repealed the questioned ordinance
and replaced it with new ordinance that
provided for a more narrow minority
preference. The city then filed a motion to
dismiss the case as moot.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held
that the case was not moot. He relied on the
Court's “well settled rule” set forth in City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. that “a
defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a
federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice.” Justice Thomas
wrote:
There is no mere risk that Jacksonville
will repeat its allegedly wrongful
conduct; it has already done so. Nor does
it matter that the new ordinance differs in
certain respects from the old one. City of
Mesquite does not stand for the
proposition that it is only the possibility
that the selfsame statute will be enacted
that prevents a case from being moot; if
that were the rule, a defendant could
moot a case by repealing the challenged
statute and replacing it with one that
differs only in some insignificant respect.
The Court concluded that the new ordinance
disadvantaged plaintiffs “in the same
fundamental way” and thus the case was not

moot. Justice O'Connor, while dissenting,
commented that:
City of Mesquite stands for the
proposition that the Court has discretion
to decide a case in which the statute
under review has been repealed or
amended. The Court appropriately may
render judgment where circumstances
demonstrate that the legislature likely
will reinstate the old law—which would
make a declaratory judgment or an order
enjoining
the
law's
enforcement
worthwhile. But such circumstances
undoubtedly are rare.
Good News' case is one of those rare cases.
The amendment of the Sign Code to allow
directional signs to be placed in the public
right-of-way moots Good News' objection to
this provision of the Sign Code, but the new
restriction,
limiting
the
Temporary
Directional Signs exemption to events that
take place in Gilbert, bars Good News from
erecting any directional signs at all. Thus, a
dismissal for mootness would allow Gilbert
to continue to limit Good News' speech
without further judicial review. Accordingly,
the motion to dismiss is denied.
II.
Reed limits our consideration of Good
News' challenges to the Sign Code.
Although our opinion in Reed reviewed the
denial of a preliminary injunction, our
determinations included conclusions of law.
Furthermore, on remand, the parties agreed
to resolve all remaining issues on crossmotions for summary judgment. There is no
indication that the parties engaged in further
discovery, and Good News has not asserted
any evidentiary facts in this appeal that were
not before us in Reed. Thus, our opinion
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in Reed constitutes law of the case and is
binding on us.
Reed establishes first that “§ 4.402(P) is not
a content-based regulation,” and second that
the Sign Code generally is a reasonable (i.e.,
not unconstitutional) time, place and manner
restriction. The single issue remanded, and
hence the primary substantive issue before
the district court and now on appeal, is
whether the Sign Code improperly
discriminates between different forms of
noncommerical speech.
We review de novo the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Gilbert.
A. The Evolving Standard for Evaluating
the Regulation of Noncommercial Speech
Judicial review of the regulation of
noncommercial speech has evolved over the
last 30 years. In 1981, Justice White, in his
plurality opinion in Metromedia stated that
while a city “may distinguish between the
relative value of different categories of
commercial speech, the city does not
have the same range of choice in the area of
noncommercial speech to evaluate the
strength of, or distinguish between, various
communicative interests.” Seven years later
in National Advertising Co. v. City of
Orange, we recognized that an ordinance
would be invalid if it imposed greater
restrictions on noncommercial than on
commercial billboards. We noted that a
restriction based on content would be
unconstitutional unless it was narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling interest, but
suggested that the city was nonetheless “not
powerless to regulate billboards containing
noncommercial
messages.”
In Desert

Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno
Valley, we indicated that an ordinance
regulating noncommercial speech would be
invalid if it imposed greater restrictions on
noncommercial than commercial billboards
or if it regulated noncommercial billboards
“based on their content.” Regarding
Gilbert's Sign Code, we have already held
that it does not impose greater restrictions
on noncommercial signs than commercial
signs, and thus the critical issue now before
us is whether the Sign Code improperly
regulates noncommercial temporary signs
based on their content.
The definition of “content neutral” has also
evolved over the last couple of decades. In
Foti, relying
on Desert
Outdoor, we
indicated that when an officer must examine
the contents of a sign to determine whether
an exemption applies, the ordinance is
content-based. However, we also noted the
Supreme Court's advice that “laws that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas
or views expressed are content based,” and
that a “speech restriction is content neutral if
it is justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech.”
More recently, following these guidelines
we have fashioned a more nuanced standard.
In G.K. Ltd., we held that “[n]either the
speaker- nor event-based exemptions
implicate Foti insofar as neither requires law
enforcement officers to read a sign's
message to determine if the sign is exempted
from the ordinance.” The standard of review
set forth is:
The “government may impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, or manner
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of engaging in protected speech provided
that they are adequately justified without
reference to the content of the regulated
speech.” In addition to being justified
without reference to content, the
restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest
and ... leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the
information.”
In Reed, applying
this
standard,
we
concluded that the Sign Code “does not
single out certain content for differential
treatment, and in enforcing the provision an
officer must merely note the content-neutral
elements of who is speaking through the
sign and whether and when an event is
occurring.” Nonetheless, this appeal raises
two unanswered questions under the G.K.
Ltd. standard: (1) are the differing
restrictions between types of noncommercial
speech “adequately justified without
reference to the content of the regulated
speech”; and (2) are they narrowly tailored?
The first issue is the fulcrum of this appeal.
B. The Restrictions on Types of
Noncommercial Speech are not Based on
the Content of the Speech.
The thrust of Good News' challenge to the
Sign Code is that its different restrictions for
different types of noncommercial speech are
inherently
content-based
and
thus
unconstitutional. However, we rejected this
general argument in Reed when we held that
distinctions based on the speaker or the
event are permissible where there is no
discrimination among similar events or
speakers. Thus, under Reed, the distinctions
between Temporary Directional Signs,
Ideological Signs, and Political Signs are

content-neutral. That is to say, each
classification and its restrictions are based
on objective factors relevant to Gilbert's
creation of the specific exemption from the
permit requirement and do not otherwise
consider the substance of the sign. The
Political Signs exemption responds to the
need
for
communication
about
elections. The Ideological Sign exemption
recognizes that an individual's right to
express his or her opinion is at the core of
the First Amendment. The Temporary
Directional Sign exemption allows the
sponsor of an event to put up temporary
directional signs immediately before the
event. Each exemption is based on objective
criteria and none draws distinctions based on
the particular content of the sign. It makes
no difference which candidate is supported,
who sponsors the event, or what ideological
perspective is asserted. Accordingly, as the
speaker and event determinations are
generally “content neutral,” Gilbert's
different exemptions for different types of
noncommercial speech are not prohibited by
the Constitution.
Our reading of Reed is in accord with our
opinion in G.K. Ltd. There the town
ordinance banned most pole signs but had a
grandfather clause for preexisting signs. We
determined that “the City's restriction on
plaintiffs' pole sign is not a content-based
regulation of plaintiffs' speech.” We
commented:
The pole sign restriction is not a “law[ ]
that by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored
speech from disfavored speech on the
basis of the ideas or views expressed.”
The Code restricts all pole signs across
the City's general commercial zones
423

without creating exceptions for preferred
content. The burdens imposed by these
pole sign restrictions are borne equally by
all of the City's residents. Further,
plaintiffs offer no evidence suggesting
illicit motive or bias on the part of the
City or that the City banned pole signs in
general, or their pole sign in particular,
because of a desire to stifle certain
viewpoints.
The plaintiffs in G.K. Ltd. argued that
ordinance's grandfather clause rendered it
content-based because town officials would
have to read the pole sign to see if it had
changed. We rejected this argument,
explaining:
Unlike Foti's exemptions, the grandfather
clause does not require Lake Oswego
officials to evaluate the substantive
message on the preexisting sign and the
clause certainly does not favor speech
“based on the idea expressed.” A
grandfather provision requiring an officer
to read a sign's message for no other
purpose than to determine if the text or
logo has changed, making the sign now
subject to the City's regulations, is not
content-based.
Under
the
controlling
precedent
of Reed and G.K. Ltd., Good News has not
shown that the Sign Code imposes a
content-based limitation.
C. Supreme Court Precedent Affirms our
Definition of Content Neutral.
As suggested in G.K. Ltd., our approach is in
accord with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hill v. Colorado. In Hill, the plaintiffs
challenged “the constitutionality of a 1993
Colorado statute that regulates speechrelated conduct within 100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility.” In

holding that the statute was constitutional,
the Supreme Court commented that it had
“never held, or suggested, that it is improper
to look at the content of an oral or written
statement in order to determine whether a
rule of law applies to a course of conduct.”
The Court noted that the statute:
places no restrictions on—and clearly
does not prohibit—either a particular
viewpoint or any subject matter that may
be discussed by a speaker. Rather, it
simply establishes a minor place
restriction on an extremely broad
category of communications with
unwilling listeners. Instead of drawing
distinctions based on the subject that the
approaching speaker may wish to
address, the statute applies equally to
used car salesmen, animal rights activists,
fundraisers,
environmentalists,
and
missionaries.
Similarly, Gilbert's Sign Code places no
restrictions on the particular viewpoints of
any person or entity that seeks to erect a
Temporary Directional Sign and the
exemption applies equally to all.
Furthermore, in Hill, the Supreme Court
explained why a statute, which only
restricted certain types of speech-related
conduct, is properly considered content
neutral. The Court reiterates that “[t]he
principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a
regulation
of
speech
because
of
disagreement with the message it
conveys.” It then offers three reasons for
why the statute is content neutral:
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First, it is not a “regulation of speech.”
Rather, it is a regulation of the places
where some speech may occur. Second, it
was
not
adopted
“because
of
disagreement with the message it
conveys.” ... Third, the State's interests in
protecting access and privacy, and
providing the police with clear
guidelines, are unrelated to the content of
the demonstrators' speech. As we have
repeatedly
explained,
government
regulation of expressive activity is
“content neutral” if it is justified without
reference to the content of regulated
speech.
The Court further stated that it had “never
held, or suggested, that it is improper to
look at the content of an oral or written
statement in order to determine whether a
rule of law applies to a course of
conduct.” The Supreme Court also
distinguished its opinion in Carey v.
Brown, noting that the Colorado statute
“places no restrictions on—and clearly
does not prohibit—either a particular
viewpoint or any subject matter that may
be discussed by a speaker.” Finally, in
response to Justice Scalia's concern that
content-based legislation can be used for
invidious thought-control purposes, the
Court stated: “[b]ut a statute that restricts
certain categories of speech only lends
itself to invidious use if there is a
significant number of communications,
raising the same problem that the statute
was enacted to solve, that fall outside the
statute's scope, while others fall inside.”
Gilbert's
regulation
of
Temporary
Directional Signs is content-neutral as that
term is defined by the Supreme Court
in Hill. Gilbert did not adopt its regulation
of speech because it disagreed with the
message conveyed. Rather, it exempted
from the permit requirement all directional

signs regardless of their content. The Code is
“a regulation of the places where some
speech may occur,” and was not adopted
“because of any disagreement with the
message it conveys.” Also, Gilbert's
interests in regulation temporary signs are
unrelated to the content of the sign.
Moreover, there is no danger of the
regulation being used for invidious thoughtcontrol purposes as the Sign Code does not
purport to regulate the content of Temporary
Directional Signs. Because Gilbert's Sign
Code places no restrictions on the particular
viewpoints of any person or entity that seeks
to erect a Temporary Directional Sign and
the exemption applies to all, it is contentneutral as that term has been defined by the
Supreme Court.
D. Good News has not shown that the
Sign Code's Different Treatment of
Different Types of Noncommercial
Speech is Unconstitutional.
Although it is conceivable, as the dissent
posits, that different exemptions for
noncommercial speech might improperly
restrict speech, that concern is not presented
here. First, as explained, the Temporary
Directional Sign exemption is a content
neutral. Second, the Temporary Directional
Sign exemption is not in competition with
other exemptions from the permit
requirement. This is not a situation where
there are a limited number of billboards or
maximum number of temporary signs that
may be placed in the public right-of-way.
Nor does the erection of temporary
directional signs in any way limit any other
person's rights to erect political, ideological,
or other signs. Accordingly, as long as the
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Temporary Directional Signs exemption—
which is the exemption that was applied to
Good News' signs and that Good News
challenges—is
content
neutral
and
reasonable in relationship to its purpose—
providing direction to temporary events—its
constitutionality is not affected by the fact
that the exemptions for Political Signs or
Ideological Signs are different.
The cases cited by the dissent do question
distinctions among different categories of
non-commercial speech, but none concerned
instances in which the types of noncommercial speech were unrelated, and all
of the cases have been refined by more
recent Supreme Court opinions. In Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance as
unconstitutional because it sought to
distinguish between peaceful labor picketing
and other peaceful picketing. Similarly,
in Carey, the Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that sought to distinguish between
picketing at a residence from picketing at a
place of employment. In Metromedia, the
Court, in a fractured opinion, considered an
ordinance that differentiated between
commercial and non-commercial billboards,
but also suggested that the city had less
leeway to distinguish between types of noncommercial speech than between types of
commercial speech. These cases concerned
related and competing forms of speech. In
contrast, Gilbert's Temporary Directional
Signs exemption neither restricts nor
competes with a person's or entity's ability to
take advantage of the exemptions for
political, ideological, or other types of
temporary signs.

Critically, as noted, over the last thirty years,
the Supreme Court has refined the concerns
set forth in Justice White's plurality opinion
in Metromedia. Most notably, in Hill, the
Supreme Court upheld a statute that clearly
distinguished
between
types
of
noncommercial
speech.
The
statute
prohibited the noncommercial speech of
“approaching” an individual “for the
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral
protest, education or counseling with such
other person.” No other form of
noncommercial speech was regulated.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the
ordinance. Similarly, in Ward, the Supreme
Court stated that a “regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others.” Thus, the Sign
Code's different provisions for Political,
Ideological and Temporary Directional
Signs is not in itself unconstitutional.
Although Good News voices some
objections to the size, location, and duration
limitations on its signs, Good News does not
assert that the restrictions actually interfere
with the purpose of the signs: providing
directions to Good News' services.
Moreover, courts have generally deferred to
municipal decisions concerning the actual
limitations on the sizes and shapes of signs.
E. The Temporary Directional Signs
Exemption is Narrowly Tailored to Serve
Significant Governmental Interests
The Supreme Court has explained that
“[c]ontent-neutral regulations do not pose
the same inherent dangers to free expression
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that content-based regulations do, and thus
are subject to a less rigorous analysis, which
affords the Government latitude in designing
a regulatory solution.” Nonetheless, a
content-neutral, reasonable time, place and
manner restriction must also be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.
There is no real question that Gilbert's
interests in safety and aesthetics are
significant. Good News argues only that
such interests are not “sufficiently
compelling to satisfy a content-based sign
code,” but we find that the Sign Code does
not impose any content-based restriction.
Good News contends that the Sign Code is
not narrowly tailored because all temporary
signs placed within the public right-of-way
implicate safety and aesthetic concerns, but
Temporary Directional Signs are more
severely limited than Political and
Ideological Signs.
Political and Ideological Signs may infringe
on Gilbert's interests to a greater extent than
Temporary Directional Signs, but for a
number of reasons this is permissible. First,
unlike political, ideological and religious
speech which are clearly entitled to First
Amendment protection, there does not
appear to be a constitutional right to an
exemption for Temporary Directional Signs.
If Good News has no constitutional right to
erect Temporary Directional Signs, how can
it suffer a cognizable harm when Gilbert
creates an exemption facilitating the display
of such signs?

Second, each exemption reflects a balance
between Gilbert's interests and the
constitutional interests of the type of sign
covered. With the recent amendment to the
Sign Code, there are no longer any
differences as to where temporary signs may
be located. The differences as to duration are
based on the natures of the types of speech
involved. Thus, under Arizona law political
signs are allowed for an extended period of
time before an election. Ideological signs,
not being tied to any event, have no time
limit. However, the purpose of a Temporary
Directional Sign inherently contemplates a
limit on duration.
Third, as noted, the exemptions are not in
competition. The exemptions are not
competing for limited space and the erection
of one type of temporary sign does not
preclude the placement of another.
Accordingly, each exemption may be
evaluated on its own merits.
Fourth, there is no showing that the
restrictions on Temporary Directional Signs
interfere with their purpose: directing
interested individuals to temporary events.
Good News does not allege that the public
cannot see its signs or that the size limit is
too small to allow it to adequately provide
directions.
Finally, as also noted, courts generally defer
to a city's determinations of size and
duration. Here, the restrictions on
Temporary Directional Signs are reasonable.
There are no limits on the number of events
that a person or entity may hold, and no
limit on the number of signs that may be
erected (other than no more than four on any
single piece of property). Also, the 12–hour
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limitation seems reasonable as a person is
unlikely to seek directions to an event more
than 12 hours before the event.
We conclude that these considerations refute
Good News' arguments that to be narrowly
tailored
restrictions
on
types
of
noncommercial speech must be uniform or
vary only to the extent that the type of
speech affects a town's interests. Our
opinions in G.K. Ltd. And Reed support, if
not compel, our conclusion. In G.K. Ltd., we
held a total ban on changed pole signs was
narrowly tailored because pole signs could
reasonably be perceived as aesthetically
harmful and distracting to travelers, even
though this is also true of unchanged pole
signs. In Reed, we determined that “[t]he
restrictions on time, place and manner
imposed by on the display of [signs] would
indeed appear to ‘actually advance’ the
aesthetic and safety interests by limiting the
size duration and proliferation of signs.” Our
determination in Reed that the Sign Code is
narrowly tailored, if not controlling, remains
sound.
In sum, (a) Gilbert was not required to
create an exemption for Temporary
Directional Signs, (b) the restrictions on
directional signs are rationally related to the
purpose of the directional signs, and (c) the
restrictions are reasonably designed to
promote Gilbert's interests in aesthetics and
safety. True, the number of temporary signs
might be substantially reduced if there were
not exemptions for political and ideological
signs, but those signs raise different legal
rights and interests that Gilbert has to
respect. Moreover, there need only be a
reasonable fit between the Gilbert's interest

and the regulations. At least between
elections, the Sign Code may well limit the
number of temporary signs in Gilbert
without unreasonably limiting anyone's
speech, and thus the Sign Code serves
significant governmental interests.
Finally, the Sign Code leaves open ample
alternate
means
of
communication.
Assuming that Good News events are
eligible for the exemption, it may erect as
many temporary signs as it wants twelve
hours before each scheduled event. The Sign
Code does not regulate any of the many
other ways in which Good News can “go
and make disciples of all nations.” Indeed,
there is no suggestion that Good News'
tenets require that it or its members erect
temporary directional signs. Thus, the Sign
Code's restrictions do not require that the
members of Good News violate any cardinal
principle of their faith and do not limit the
many other ways the members may
advertise their services and attract
individuals.
F. Good News' Other Challenges do not
Merit Relief
1. To prevail on its claims of violation of its
members' right to the free exercise of
religion under the Constitution and under
Arizona's Free Exercise of Religion Act,
Good News must show that “the government
action substantially burdens the exercise of
religious beliefs.” Good News' free exercise
claim fails because the Sign Code's
restrictions on the size and duration of
Temporary Directional Signs is a generally
applicable law, and it does not substantially
interfere with any of Good News' tenets.
The Supreme Court has held that religion
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may not exempt a person from complying
with neutral laws. Furthermore, while Good
News' members may be obligated to spread
their message and advertise their events,
there is no suggestion that Good News'
tenets require that they do so in any
particular way. Accordingly, we agree with
the district court that the Sign Code's
restrictions on Temporary Directional Signs
do not constitute a substantial burden on
Good News' free exercise rights.

entities. Because we conclude that the Sign
Code is not unconstitutional just because it
differentiates
between
types
of
noncommercial signs, Good News' equal
protection argument depends on it
establishing a cognizable class of
noncommercial entities wishing to erect
temporary directional signs to their events
whose interests may be compared to some
other class. Good News has failed to identify
such entities.

2. We also agree with the district court that
the Sign Code is not vague or overbroad.
The Supreme Court noted in Ward, that
“perfect clarity and precise guidance have
never been required even of regulations that
restrict express activity.” Good News' claim
of vagueness is based on an alleged lack of
definitions for signs that arguably meet the
requirements of more than one temporary
sign exemption. However, Gilbert officials
claim that they have yet to see such a sign
and Good News does not argue that its signs
meet the requirements of more than one
exemption. In addition, in Reed, we held that
Good News' mounted only an as-applied
challenge to the Sign Code. This is law of
the case, and is not really challenged by
Good News.

G. Any Challenge Good News May
Advance to the Amended Sign Code
Should Be Initially Litigated in the
District Court

3. Good News' assertion that the Sign Code
violates its right to equal protection of law is
basically a revision of its argument that
Gilbert cannot treat different types of
noncommercial speech differently. Clothed
in the garb of equal protection the argument
still is not persuasive. The Sign Code does
not make any distinctions based on religion.
Rather, the Temporary Directional Signs
exemption is available to all noncommercial

Although the amendment to the Sign Code
does not moot this appeal, we need not, and
do not, determine the merits of the
amendment. Unlike the situation before the
Supreme
Court
in Northeastern
Florida, here the amendment arguably
increases rather than decreases the barriers
to Good News erecting temporary
directional signs. Also, unlike the holding
in Northeastern
Florida, we
have
determined that Good News has not shown
that the other restrictions imposed by the
Sign Code violate its constitutional rights.
However, the added restriction to the Sign
Code—that Temporary Directional Signs are
only exempt from the permit requirement if
they concern events that take place within
the Town of Gilbert—is different in nature
from the time, place, and manner restrictions
that Good News previously challenged.
Moreover, even if we assume that Good
News will challenge the new restriction, we
do not know what constitutional and legal
arguments Good News will present in
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challenging the restriction, or what defenses
Gilbert will proffer. Accordingly, any
challenge Good News may have to the
amendment
limiting the Temporary
Directional Sign exemption to events in the
Town of Gilbert should be raised in the first
instance in the district court. As we affirm
the district court's grant of summary
judgment for Gilbert, we leave it to the
district court to determine whether Good
News may seek to amend its existing
complaint or should file a new complaint.
III
In Reed, and G.K. Ltd., we held that
distinctions based on the speaker or the
event are permissible where there is no
discrimination among similar events or
speakers. In Hill, the Supreme Court
indicated
that
not
all
types
of
noncommercial speech need be treated the
same. Applying this case law to the Town of
Gilbert's Sign Code's treatment of different
types of noncommercial speech, we
conclude that the treatment is contentneutral. That is to say, each exemption
allowing for the erection of temporary signs
and its restrictions are based on objective
factors relevant to the creation of the
specific exemption and do not otherwise
consider the substance of a sign. We further
conclude that the exemptions are narrowly
tailored because they serve significant
governmental interests and leave open
ample
alternative
channels
of
communication. We also conclude that the
Sign Code does not violate Good News' (or
its members') right to the free exercise of
religion or right to equal protection of law,
and is not unconstitutionally vague or

overbroad. The district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Town of
Gilbert is AFFIRMED.
WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the postjudgment amendments to the Town of
Gilbert's sign ordinance do not render this
appeal moot. But I disagree with the
majority's conclusion that the sign ordinance
is constitutional.
When this case first came before us, we
evaluated § 4.402(P) of Gilbert's sign
ordinance in isolation. That provision
specifies the restrictions applicable to
“temporary directional signs relating to a
qualifying event,” such as the signs plaintiff
Good News Community Church seeks to
display inviting people to attend its Sunday
morning services. We held that, with respect
to the temporary directional signs it covers,
§ 4.402(P) is content-neutral. We reached
that conclusion because, considered on its
own, § 4.402(P) “does not single out certain
content for differential treatment, and in
enforcing the provision an officer must
merely note the content-neutral elements of
who is speaking through the sign and
whether an event is occurring.”
What we did not decide in Reed I is whether
§ 4.402(P) is impermissibly content-based
when viewed in relation to the other
provisions of Gilbert's sign ordinance. In
particular, we noted that the district court
had not addressed plaintiffs' argument that
“the ordinance unfairly discriminates among
forms of noncommercial speech” by
granting more favorable treatment to signs
that Gilbert categorizes as “political” and
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“ideological.” We therefore remanded the
case for resolution of plaintiffs' “First
Amendment and Equal Protection claims
that the Sign Code is unconstitutional in
favoring some noncommercial speech over
other noncommercial speech.”
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection
Clause
and
the
First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause prohibit
the government from favoring certain
categories of non-commercial speech over
others based solely on the content of the
message being conveyed. When regulating
speech in a public forum, the government
may draw distinctions among different
categories of non-commercial speech only if
those distinctions are justified by some noncommunicative aspect of the speech
involved. For example, a State may not
exempt labor picketing from a general ban
on picketing in front of homes (enacted to
protect residential privacy), unless it can
show that labor picketing is inherently less
disruptive of residential privacy than
picketing on other subjects. The reason is
simple: Within the realm of noncommercial
speech, the government may not decide that
speech on certain subjects is more (or less)
valuable—and therefore more (or less)
deserving of First Amendment protection—
than speech on other subjects.
The Supreme Court relied on this general
principle to strike down a municipal sign
ordinance in Metromedia. A plurality of the
Court invalidated San Diego's ordinance
banning most non-commercial billboards on
the ground that the ordinance impermissibly
granted exemptions for billboards bearing
non-commercial speech on favored subjects,

such as political campaign messages. The
plurality held that, although cities “may
distinguish between the relative value of
different categories of commercial speech,”
they do not have the same freedom in the
realm of non-commercial speech “to
evaluate the strength of, or distinguish
between, various communicative interests.”
San Diego could not identify any noncommunicative aspect of the speech at issue
to justify the distinctions it had drawn. It
failed to show, for example, that the noncommercial billboards it banned had any
greater effect on the city's asserted interests
in promoting traffic safety and aesthetics
than the non-commercial billboards it
permitted.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, Hill v.
Colorado did not modify or refine the core
principle
underlying Mosley, Carey,
and Metromedia. The statute at issue
in Hill prohibited, within certain designated
areas, approaching within eight feet of
another for the purpose of engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling. The Court
held that the statute was content-neutral
because it regulated a particular mode of
communication—approaching within eight
feet of another to engage in oral protest,
education, or counseling—without regard to
the subject of the speaker's message. As the
Court stressed, “Instead of drawing
distinctions based on the subject that the
approaching speaker may wish to address,
the statute applies equally to used car
salesmen,
animal
rights
activists,
fundraisers,
environmentalists,
and
missionaries.”
Thus,
rather
than
distinguishing among different categories of
non-commercial speech based on the
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message being conveyed, the Colorado
statute
prohibited all non-commercial
speech expressed through a particular mode
of
communication—a
fact
that
rendered Carey “easily distinguishable.”
Gilbert's sign ordinance violates the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by drawing
content-based distinctions among different
categories of non-commercial speech. The
most glaring illustration is the ordinance's
favorable treatment of “political” and
“ideological” signs relative to the treatment
accorded
the
non-commercial
signs
plaintiffs seek to display. Under the
ordinance, plaintiffs' temporary directional
signs may not exceed six square feet in size
and may not be displayed more than 12
hours before or one hour after the relevant
event—here, Sunday morning church
services. (Given the 9:00 a.m. start time of
Good News's church services, this
durational restriction limits the display of
plaintiffs' signs to periods when it is
virtually always dark.) In contrast,
“political” signs—defined as “[a] temporary
sign which supports candidates for office or
urges action on any other matter on the
ballot of primary, general and special
elections relating to any national, state or
local election”—may be up to 32 square feet
in size and may be displayed any time prior
to an election and removed within 10 days
after the election. “Ideological” signs—
defined as “a sign communicating a message
or ideas for non-commercial purposes” that
is not a construction, directional, political, or
garage sale sign—may be up to 20 square
feet in size and are not subject to any
durational limits at all.

Gilbert's sign ordinance plainly favors
certain categories of non-commercial speech
(political and ideological signs) over others
(signs promoting events sponsored by nonprofit organizations) based solely on the
content of the message being conveyed.
These are not content-neutral “speaker” and
“event” based distinctions, like those we
approved in G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake
Oswego and in Reed I when we reviewed §
4.402(P) standing alone. Determining
whether a particular sign will be regulated as
a “political” sign as opposed to an
“ideological” sign or a “temporary
directional sign relating to a qualifying
event” turns entirely on the content of the
message displayed on the sign.
The content-based distinctions Gilbert has
drawn are impermissible unless it can
identify some non-communicative aspect of
the signs at issue to justify this differential
treatment. Gilbert has merely offered, as
support for the sign ordinance as a whole, its
interest in enhancing traffic safety and
aesthetics. Traffic safety and aesthetics are
certainly important interests. But to sustain
the distinctions it has drawn, Gilbert must
explain why (for example) a 20–square–foot
sign displayed indefinitely at a particular
location poses an acceptable threat to traffic
safety and aesthetics if it bears an
ideological message, but would pose an
unacceptable threat if the sign's message
instead invited people to attend Sunday
church services.
Gilbert has not offered any such
explanation, and I doubt it could come up
with one if it tried. What we are left with,
then, is Gilbert's apparent determination that
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“ideological” and “political” speech is
categorically more valuable, and therefore
entitled to greater protection from
regulation, than speech promoting events
sponsored by non-profit organizations. That
is precisely the value judgment that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments forbid Gilbert
to make.
Nothing we said in Reed I is inconsistent
with this conclusion. There we held only
that § 4.402(P), viewed in isolation, is a
valid content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation. We did not decide, and
instead remanded for the district court to
decide, whether Gilbert's sign ordinance
draws content-based distinctions by
“favoring some noncommercial speech over
other noncommercial speech.” In doing so,
we
mentioned
as
potentially
relevant National Advertising Co. v. City of
Orange where (we noted in Reed I) we

invalidated a municipal sign ordinance that
“made content-based distinctions among
categories of noncommercial speech.” Thus,
when we said in Reed I that §
4.402(P) “does not single out certain content
for differential treatment,” we obviously did
not decide whether the sign ordinance as a
whole singles out certain content for
differential treatment. Otherwise, our
remand to the district court would have been
entirely unnecessary.
For the reasons given above, I would hold
that the regulatory distinctions Gilbert has
drawn among different categories of noncommercial speech are unconstitutional, and
I would remand for the district court to
determine whether those provisions of
Gilbert's sign ordinance are severable. I
respectfully dissent from the majority's
contrary holding.
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“U.S. Supreme Court Will Hear Arizona Church-Sign Case”
USA Today
Parker Leavitt
July 2, 2014
A prolonged legal battle between Gilbert,
Ariz., and a small Presbyterian church over
religious signs is headed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, with oral arguments likely
to start later this year.
The court on Tuesday announced that it
would hear Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which
alleges the town's sign code is
discriminatory in preventing Good News
Presbyterian Church from posting roadside
signs the day before worship services.
Gilbert officials have argued — and courts
have agreed — that the rules treat churches
no differently than other non-commercial
groups and that the signs are not regulated
based on who posts them.
A three-member panel for the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals last year sided with
Gilbert, although the decision was not
unanimous and one dissenting judge argued
that the town's law is unconstitutional.
Gilbert's code prohibits non-commercial
event signs, including the church signs
advertising worship services, from going up
more than 12 hours beforehand in public
rights-of-way.
In contrast, political signs can be placed 60
days before an election. Ideological signs,
which are meant to convey a noncommercial message or idea, can be posted
in any zoning district and left up
indefinitely. This could be a message touting
world peace, for example.

Alliance Defending Freedom, representing
Good News pastor Clyde Reed, last year
asked the Supreme Court to clarify how
judges should determine whether an
ordinance discriminates based on content,
citing disagreement among circuit courts on
the issue.
The notion of content-neutral law could
apply to a wide range of issues, including
public events, for example. A law forbidding
all parades down Main Street would be
neutral, while a law that bans an
immigration rally would not.
The Supreme Court typically grants 70 to 80
— or about 1% — of the 8,000 or so
petitions it receives each year, Arizona State
University law professor Paul Bender said.
Since the Gilbert case appears to involve a
conflict among circuit courts, it's not
surprising the Supreme Court agreed to take
it on, Bender said.
"This is not a frivolous petition," Bender
said. "It's a really important question that
determines a lot of First Amendment cases."
The U.S. Supreme Court typically weighs in
on issues with implications beyond an
individual case, and the Gilbert dispute
appears to fit that profile. At least four of the
nine Supreme Court justices must agree to
accept a petition before the court will hear a
case.
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Matt Sharp, legal counsel for Alliance
Defending Freedom, cheered the court's
decision to hear the case, saying it had been
in limbo for months.
"I think this court has shown a strong desire
to clarify these important issues regarding
First Amendment rights," Sharp said.
Alliance Defending Freedom, based in
Scottsdale, Ariz., is a conservative
organization launched in 1994. It litigates
cases tied to religion, abortion and gay
marriage. The group claims more than three
dozen U.S. Supreme Court victories.
Good
News
Presbyterian
Church's
congregation consists of a few dozen
members who meet weekly at a Gilbert
senior-living center.
Gilbert's dispute with the church began in
2005, when the town's code-compliance
department cited the church for posting
signs too early in the public right of way.
The church responded by reducing the
number of signs and the amount of time they
were out, but Gilbert notified church

officials again in 2007 that they were in
violation.
Good News filed a lawsuit in March 2007
alleging that the code regulating signs
discriminated against religious groups by
violating free-speech rights.
Gilbert suspended the code while the case
made its way through court, but that
changed in 2008, when Gilbert adopted a
sign-code amendment.
The changes allowed churches and other
groups to post bigger signs, no limit on the
number of signs and more time for them to
be up. Town officials also lumped
charitable, community-service, educational
and other non-profits into the same category
as churches for restrictions.
Gilbert Town Attorney Michael Hamblin
said courts have rejected Alliance Defending
Freedom's claims four times and the town
believes the Supreme Court will do the
same.
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“Reed v. Town of Gilbert: an Important First Amendment Content
Discrimination Case, to be Heard by the Court this Coming Year”
The Washington Post
Eugene Volokh
July 7, 2014
Last week, the Court agreed to hear Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, an important case on the
distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions. When the
government is acting as sovereign —
imposing rules for all of us, rather than just
for its own property or its employees — it
generally has very limited power to impose
content-based speech restrictions. There are
some
historically
recognized
First
Amendment
exceptions
(e.g.,
libel,
incitement, obscenity, and the like) that
allow certain kinds of content-based
restrictions, but outside such zones, contentbased restrictions are almost never allowed.
In theory, the restrictions are upheld only if
they are “narrowly tailored” to a
“compelling government interest.” In
practice, the restrictions are upheld almost
never. But content-neutral restrictions, such
as limits on all speech amplification louder
than a certain volume, limits on the time and
place of parades or demonstrations, and the
like, are often upheld — not always, but
often. Viewpoint-neutral but content-based
restrictions, such as bans on display of nude
scenes on drive-in theater screens visible
from the road, bans on profanity in public
places, and the like are treated the same as
content-based restrictions (again, when the
government is acting as sovereign).
This makes it particularly important to
clearly define the line between contentbased and content-neutral restrictions. Reed

v. Town of Gilbert should give us some
more clarity on the subject. The UCLA First
Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, which I
run, filed an amicus brief urging the Court to
support the case; the brief was on behalf of
Profs. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Eric Freedman,
Richard Garnett, Seth Kreimer, Nadine
Strossen, William Van Alstyne, and James
Weinstein, and my students Curtis Brown,
Tess Curet, and Ali Vaqar worked on the
brief. Here is the text, which should also
give you an idea of the issue and the main
arguments, though you can also read the
Ninth Circuit decision (and especially the
excellent dissent, by Judge Paul Watford, for
whom I have great respect).
***
Summary of Argument
The speech restriction in this case, which
distinguishes (1) signs “support[ing]
candidates” or relating to “any other matter
on the ballot,” (2) “sign[s] communicating a
message or ideas,” and (3) signs related to
noncommercial “event[s],” is facially
content-based. It may well not turn on the
viewpoint of speech, or be motivated by
legislative disagreement with certain ideas.
Yet many precedents from this Court have
made clear that such content classifications
make a law content-based, even in the
absence of improper legislative motive.

436

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit panel
majority in this case treated this contentbased law as content-neutral, and in the
process exacerbated a three-way split among
eight circuits. Some circuit court decisions,
including the decision below, seem to be
focusing on occasional remarks in this
Court’s cases about the importance of
whether speech was restricted because of
legislative hostility to its message. But those
decisions are ignoring the many precedents
from this Court striking down content-based
laws regardless of the absence of any such
hostility. This Court ought to grant certiorari
to resolve this split, and to reaffirm the
importance of treating content-based speech
restrictions
as
presumptively
unconstitutional.
Argument
This should have been an easy case. The
Town’s sign code facially discriminates
based on the content of signs, expressly
distinguishing
1. “temporary sign[s] which support[]
candidates for office or urge[s]
action on any other matter on the
ballot,” which can be up to 32 square
feet in size,
2. “sign[s] communicating a message
or
ideas
for
noncommercial
purposes” that are not related to a
“qualifying event,” which can be up
to 20 square feet in size, and
3. noncommercial signs that do relate
to a “qualifying event,” which can
only be up to 6 square feet in size.

Under this Court’s precedents, the law is
therefore content-based. Yet the Ninth
Circuit panel majority concluded the law
was content-neutral—and the three-way,
eight-circuit split identified by the petition
has led many other courts to make similar
errors.
The panel majority’s reasoning apparently
rested on the conclusions that the Town was
not motivated by a desire “to suppress
certain ideas,” by “disagreement with the
message [the speech] conveys,” or by any
other “illicit motive,” and that the law
was viewpoint-neutral. Yet this Court has
repeatedly
made
clear
that
laws
distinguishing speech based on content—
specifically including laws distinguishing
campaign-related speech from other
speech—are content-based even if they are
viewpoint-neutral and not prompted by any
motive to suppress particular ideas.
Thus, for example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec.
Comm’n, this Court held that a law requiring
campaign literature to be signed was
content-based. Part of the reason was that
“the category of covered documents is
defined by their content—only those
publications containing speech designed to
influence the voters in an election need bear
the required markings.” This was so “even
though
[the]
provision
applie[d]
evenhandedly to advocates of differing
viewpoints.” And because of this content
discrimination, the law was subject not to
intermediate scrutiny, but to “exacting
scrutiny.” Likewise, in this case the category
of specially treated signs “is defined by their
content”—“only those [signs] containing
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speech designed to influence the voters in an
election” may be over 20 square feet in area.
Similarly, in Burson v. Freeman, this Court
treated a restriction on electioneering within
100 feet of a polling place as content-based:
“Whether individuals may exercise
their free speech rights near polling
places depends entirely on whether
their speech is related to a political
campaign. This Court has held that
the First Amendment’s hostility to
content-based regulation extends not
only to a restriction on a particular
viewpoint, but also to a prohibition
of public discussion of an entire
topic.”
Likewise, in this case, “whether individuals
may exercise their free speech rights [using
large signs] depends entirely on whether
their speech is related to a political
campaign,” and “whether individuals may
exercise their free speech rights [using
medium-sized signs] depends entirely on
whether their speech is related to [a specific
event].” Yet “the First Amendment’s
hostility to content-based regulation extends
[beyond] restriction[s] on a particular
viewpoint,” and includes regulation based
on whether speech relates to an election, to
ideology generally, or to a “qualifying
event.”
Similarly, Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y.
and Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n made clear that an
exclusion of all political advertising from a
city-owned bus system was content-based.
This Court had upheld such an exclusion in
Lehman v. Shaker Heights based on the
city’s power as a proprietor of a nonpublic

forum. But Consolidated Edison and Perry
make clear that the exclusion was upheld in
spite of being content-based, solely because
of this extra government power over
nonpublic fora (a power that is not
implicated in this case).
To
be
sure,
the
restrictions
in McIntyre, Burson, and Lehman treated
election-related speech or political speech
worse than speech with other content, and
the restriction in Reed treats election-related
speech better. But the analytical question
whether the restriction is content-based must
be the same whether the restriction favors a
category of speech or disfavors it.
This Court has likewise treated as contentbased many other restrictions that seem
highly unlikely to have been motivated by a
desire to suppress particular ideas. For
example, in Regan v. Time, Inc., this Court
struck down a statutory provision that
limited photographic reproductions of
United States currency, but exempted
reproductions “for philatelic, numismatic,
educational, historical, or newsworthy
purposes to content that was educational or
newsworthy.” This Court held that the law
was
content-based,
because
“[a]
determination
concerning
the
newsworthiness or educational value of a
photograph cannot help but be based on the
content of the photograph and the message it
delivers.”
The statutory exemption was likely not
prompted by hostility to any particular
views, or even to any particular subjects.
Yet this Court treated the law as contentbased. Likewise, just as in Regan v. Time,
Inc., the determination of whether a sign in
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Gilbert can be up to 30 square feet or at
most 24 or even just 6 square feet “cannot
help but be based on the content” of the
message the sign delivers.
Even where signs concern commercial
speech, this Court has struck down speech
restrictions that discriminate based on the
content of the sign. In City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, the government,
motivated by safety and aesthetic concerns,
barred the distribution of commercial
publications through freestanding newsracks
on public sidewalks. In striking down this
ordinance, this Court noted that there was no
evidence that the city acted with any animus
toward
the
ideas
in
respondents’
publications. But the decision nonetheless
rejected the view that “discriminatory
treatment is suspect under the First
Amendment only when the legislature
intends to suppress certain ideas.”
As in Discovery Network, the town of
Gilbert might not have had illicit motives in
enacting the Sign Ordinance. But that should
be just as irrelevant here as in that case. And
if the regulation in Discovery Network was
content-based even as to commercial speech,
surely Gilbert’s Sign Code must be contentbased when it discriminates based on
content among noncommercial speech.
Similarly, in Arkansas Writers’ Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, this Court struck down as
unconstitutionally content-based a state sales
tax exemption for “religious, professional,
trade, and sports journals.” There was no
evidence of any improper censorial motive.
Still, this Court held that, because Arkansas
“enforcement authorities must necessarily
examine the content of the message that is

conveyed” to determine a magazine’s tax
status, the basis on which Arkansas
differentiates
between
magazines is
“particularly repugnant to First Amendment
principles.”
To give just two more examples, in Police
Department
of
Chicago v. Mosley
and Carey v. Brown, this Court viewed as
content-based restrictions that banned all
picketing in certain places (near schools and
residences, respectively), but exempted
labor picketing. Those restrictions were
doubtless not motivated by hostility to all
non-labor-picketing views. Nonetheless,
because they distinguished speech based on
content, they were treated as content-based.
To be sure, this Court has at times treated as
content-neutral laws that are seen as
focusing on the “secondary effects” of
speech. But political signs, ideological signs,
and event signs are no different in any of
their possible “secondary effects.”
In this respect, this case is just
like Discovery Network (though involving
fully protected speech, not just commercial
speech). In Discovery Network, this Court
noted that, “[i]n contrast to the speech at
issue in [City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.], there are no secondary
effects attributable to respondent publishers’
newsracks that distinguish them from the
newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on
its sidewalks.” Likewise, there are no
secondary effects attributable to Reed’s
signs promoting religious events that
distinguish them from the political signs that
the Town of Gilbert allows to be much
larger.

439

The distinction between content-based and
content-neutral restrictions has emerged as
one of the most important rules of First
Amendment law. And this Court has
repeatedly stressed to lower courts the
significance of this distinction.
Yet the decision below, alongside many
other circuit court opinions, calls contentneutral that which is indubitably contentbased. Those circuit courts have picked up

on some remarks in this Court’s
jurisprudence that might seem to call for an
inquiry into legislative motivation. But those
courts have failed to apply the many
precedents from this Court cited above,
precedents
that Hill and Ward were
obviously not seeking to overturn. This
Court should grant certiorari in this case, to
clarify the content discrimination standard
both for sign cases and for free speech cases
more broadly.
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“Born (Again) Under a Bad Sign: Ninth Circuit Upholds Ordinance
Restricting Duration, Location, Quantity, and Size of Directional Signs for
Church Services”
Abbott & Kindermann Land Use Law Blog
William W. Abbott
February 21, 2013
As part of its overall regulatory code, the
City of Gilbert, Arizona enacted various
sign regulations. The regulations generally
require a City issued sign permit unless the
sign qualifies under one of nineteen different
exceptions. Three of the nineteen exceptions
involved (1) temporary directional signs for
a qualifying event, (2) political signs and (3)
ideological signs. Temporary directional
signs subject to the exemption were subject
to specific limitations not applicable to
political and ideological signs including
size, location (excluded from public right of
way), and duration (same day only).
Pastor Reed and Good News Community
Church (“Good News”) initially filed suit
challenging the limitations on the temporary
directional signs, signs which the church
relied upon for communication with its
congregation and to the community. In
response to Good News’ request for a
preliminary injunction, the district court
determined that this lawsuit was an “as
applied” challenge (as applied to Good
News as compared to a facial challenge to
the ordinance.) Next, in the initial round of
litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the ordinance was
not a content based regulation, and that it
was appropriately narrowly tailored in
limiting speech. The appellate court also
upheld the district court’s determination that

the church had alternate means of
communications. Finally, and again in the
context of review the denial of the
preliminary injunction request by the district
court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
district court did not error when it concluded
that the ordinance did not favor commercial
over non-commercial speech. The matter
was remanded to the district court to address
equal protection and First Amendment
Claims where, by stipulation, the matter was
submitted based upon cross motions for
summary judgment. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the City of
Gilbert. Following Good News’ second
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the City
amended its sign ordinance, then moved to
dismiss the appeal on the grounds of
mootness. One element of the amendment
restricted the use of directional signs only
for events taking place within City limits, an
amendment which would have had the effect
of prohibiting Good News from placing
signs as church services occurred outside
city limits. While the amendments
potentially resolved some of Good News
appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the motion
to dismiss, exercising its discretion to
review the local regulations.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the
somewhat narrow and unusual posture of the
case. Upon remand, there had been no
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further discovery, and no suggestion that an
additional evidentiary proceeding was
necessary. Accordingly, the justices viewed
the legal conclusions from the earlier
decision as the “law of the case”, framing in
part the review of the appeal of the final
judgment in favor of the City. The following
unresolved questions on appeal involved: (1)
were the different restrictions applicable to
different types of commercial speech
justified without reference to the content of
the speech; and (2) are the differences
narrowly tailored. Although the exercise of
segregating sign types between directional,
political and ideological involved some
review of sign content, drawing such
distinctions between general categories was
acceptable in circumstances in which the
ordinance was neutral as to signs within a
particular category. Each exemption was
based upon objective criteria and no
distinction was based upon the individual
sign content. The Court then focused on
whether the ordinance was “narrowly
tailored” to serve a legitimate government
interest. There was no dispute that the City’s
interests in aesthetics and safety were

significant. The Court went on to note that
the same constitutional considerations in
protecting political, religious and ideological
speech did not apply to temporary
directional signs, the effect of which was to
subject an ordinance creating an exemption
for directional signs to less judicial scrutiny
as compared to more protected speech. On
the evidence before the Court, the Court
concluded that the regulations of temporary
directional signs were reasonable. Turning
to protections under Arizona’s freedom of
religion statute, the Court also upheld the
ordinance and regulations as it was neutral
in character and was not a “substantial
burden.” Good News’ challenge based upon
vagueness of the ordinance was rejected in
part on the basis that the law of the case
restricted the plaintiff’s claims to “as
applied” challenges. The Court also
disposed of Good News’ equal protection
claims on the same grounds as the plaintiff’s
primary claims were resolved. As to the
potential claims to the amended ordinance,
the Ninth Circuit remanded those potential
arguments to the district court.
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NEW TOPIC: HOBBY LOBBY FOLLOW-UP
“What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America”
New York Times
Binyamin Appelbaum
July 22, 2014

Last month, as you’ve probably heard, a
closely divided Supreme Court ruled that
corporations with religious owners cannot
be required to pay for insurance coverage of
contraception. The so-called Hobby Lobby
decision, named for the chain of craft stores
that brought the case, has been both praised
and condemned for expanding religious
rights and constraining Obamacare. But
beneath the political implications, the ruling
has significant economic undertones. It
expands the right of corporations to be
treated like people, part of a trend that may
be contributing to the rise of economic
inequality.
The notion that corporations are people is
ridiculous on its face, but often true.
Although Mitt Romney was mocked for
saying it on the campaign trail a few
summers ago, the U.S. Code, our national
rule book, defines corporations as people in
its very first sentence. And since the 19th
century, the Supreme Court has ruled that
corporations are entitled to a wide range of
constitutional protections. This was a
business decision, and it was a good one.
Incorporation
encourages
risk-taking:
Investors are far more likely to put money
into a business that can outlast its creators;
managers, for their part, are more likely to
take risks themselves because they owe
nothing to the investors if they fail.

The rise of corporations, which developed
more fully in the United States than in other
industrializing nations, helped to make it the
richest nation on earth. And economic
historians have found that states where
businesses could incorporate more easily
tended to grow more quickly, aiding New
York’s rise as a banking center and helping
Pennsylvania’s coal industry to outstrip
Virginia’s. The notion of corporate
personhood still sounds weird, but we rely
upon it constantly in our everyday lives. The
corporation that published this column, for
instance, is exercising its constitutional right
to speak freely and to make contracts, taking
money from some of you and giving a little
to me.
Since the 1950s, however, the treatment of
corporations as people has expanded beyond
its original economic logic. According to
Naomi Lamoreaux, a professor of
economics and history at Yale University,
the success of incorporation led states to
broaden eligibility to advocacy groups, like
the N.A.A.C.P. and the Congress of Racial
Equality, which then became “the first
corporations to convince the Court that they
deserved a broader set of rights.” Ever since,
the court has intermittently extended the
logic of those rulings, and in 2010 it ruled
that an advocacy group called Citizens
United had the right to spend money on
political advertising — and that every other
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corporation did, too. Last month, it added
religious rights to the mix.
The basic justification is that corporations,
owned by people, should have the same
freedoms as people. And in many ways, of
course, they already do. Chick-fil-A does
not sell sandwiches on Sundays. Interstate
Batteries tells prospective employees,
“While it is not necessary to be a Christian
to be employed, it is a part of the daily work
life for Interstate team members.” In 1999,
Omni Hotels said its new owner, a Christian,
had made a “moral decision” to stop selling
pay-per-view pornography.
But corporations, as F. Scott Fitzgerald
might have put it, are not like you and me.
Those special legal powers, which allow
them to play a valuable role in the economy,
can also give them the financial power to tilt
the rules of the game by lobbying for
particular legislation, among other things.
“Those properties, so beneficial in the
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the
political sphere,” Justice William Rehnquist
wrote in a dissenting opinion from a 1978
ruling that is a precursor to Citizens United.
“Indeed, the States might reasonably fear
that the corporation would use its economic
power to obtain further benefits beyond
those already bestowed.”
The danger is not only that corporations can
act at the expense of society, but also that
the people who control them can act at the
expense of their own shareholders,
employees and customers. While the Hobby
Lobby decision ostensibly addresses only a
narrow set of circumstances — a corporation
with relatively few owners, a religious

objection to particular kinds of birth control
— these sorts of limited rulings have a
history of becoming more broadly cited as
precedent over time. Also, the logic of this
particular decision was so expansive and
open-ended. “A corporation is simply a form
of organization used by human beings to
achieve desired ends,” Justice Samuel Alito
wrote. “When rights, whether constitutional
or statutory, are extended to corporations,
the purpose is to protect the rights of these
people.” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued in her dissenting opinion that a
corporation might object on religious
grounds to paying for blood transfusions,
vaccinations or antidepressants. Other
scholars say the same logic could justify a
right to privacy as a shield against
regulatory scrutiny, or a right to bear arms.
Minority shareholders have little power to
influence the choices that corporations
make. Benjamin I. Sachs, a law professor at
Harvard University, notes that while federal
law lets union members prevent the use of
their
dues
for
political
purposes,
shareholders do not have similar rights. “If
we’re going to say that collectives have
speech rights, then we should treat unions
and corporations the same,” Sachs told me.
Employees are even more vulnerable. When
companies like YUM! Brands, which owns
KFC and Taco Bell, campaign against
minimum-wage
increases,
they
are
effectively using the profits generated by
their employees to limit the compensation of
those same employees. And of course, some
of Hobby Lobby’s 13,000 workers will now
need to pay for contraception.
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Shareholders can sell their shares, sure, and
employees can find new jobs. But every
increase in corporate rights is a potential
limitation on the menu of available jobs and
investments. “The idea that if you don’t like
what the corporation is doing you should
sell your stock, or find a different job, has a
certain amount of appeal,” said Darrell A.H.
Miller, a professor of law at Duke
University. “But it also assumes that people
are able to just fish and cut bait. Capital is

easier to move around than your body and
your family.”
If the court follows the logic of its Hobby
Lobby decision in the decades to come, it’s
not so hard to imagine a job market where
people must interview employers about their
religious and political views. Or where
people who need to make a living may just
feel compelled to accept a work
environment increasingly shaped by their
employers’ beliefs.
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“Fault Lines Re-Emerge in U.S. Supreme Court at End of Term”
Reuters
Joan Biskupic
June 30, 2014
Sometimes there is no middle ground.
Through much of the U.S. Supreme Court's
term, the nine justices found common if
narrow ground to bridge their differences.
Many of their high-profile decisions avoided
the polarization that defines Washington
today. That all changed on Monday, the last
day of the nine-month term, with the reemergence of a familiar 5-4 fault line in a
dispute over a U.S. law requiring employers
to provide insurance for contraceptives.
For 30 minutes Justice Samuel Alito, a
conservative who wrote the majority
opinion, and liberal Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who wrote the lead dissent,
voiced their competing views of the
meaning for America of the decision
permitting some corporate employers to
object on religious grounds to certain kinds
of birth control.
In recent weeks the justices had resolved an
array of disputes, including over abortion
protests and presidential appointment power,
police searches of cellphones and
environmental regulation, as well as rules
for class-action lawsuits.
In all of those, the nine managed to find
shared terrain, even some unanimity. In the
cases over abortion protests and presidential
“recess” appointments, the justices ruled 9-0
on the bottom line, even as four justices
broke away each time to protest the
majority’s legal reasoning.

But religion is different. The justices divide
bitterly over it. Monday's case was further
clouded by the issue of reproductive rights
and the assertion by the family-owned
companies in the dispute that some
contraceptive drugs and devices are akin to
abortion.
In the case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, the companies challenged the
Obamacare insurance requirement for
employee birth control. They objected to
four methods, including the so-called
morning-after pill. They said they should
qualify for an exemption under a 1993
religious freedom law. The Obama
administration countered that for-profit
corporations, even closely held ones, are not
covered by the 1993 law.
In his opinion for the court's five
conservatives, Alito said there was a federal
interest in ensuring that people who run
their businesses for profit not compromise
their religious beliefs. “A corporation is
simply a form of organisation used by
human beings to achieve desired ends,” he
said. He asserted the decision would have
limited effect.
Alito said Congress did not want to exclude
people who operate for-profit businesses
from the law's protections. Ginsburg
countered that such a view effectively
allows religious owners to impose their
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views on employees who might not share
their belief.

including one brought by Halliburton testing
how easily shareholders can band together in
class-action lawsuits for damages.

"STARTLING BREADTH"
In her dissent representing the four liberals,
Ginsburg called the ruling one of “startling
breadth.” A women’s rights advocate in the
1970s, she recalled how the court had long
declared contraceptive coverage crucial to
women’s participation in the economic life
of the country.
The last announced opinion of the term,
Monday's case was arguably the most highprofile. It forced the justices to confront
difficult issues against the backdrop of the
enduringly
controversial
2010
signature healthcare law of Democratic
President Barack Obama.
The term featured none of the blockbuster
decisions of the past two years when the
court upheld the Obamacare law and set the
pace for same-sex marriage and voting
rights. All told, this term's cases failed to
capture public attention the same way. The
rulings gave each side - left and right something to call a triumph.

When the court separately ruled that the
streaming video service Aereo Inc had
violated copyright law, the majority stressed
the decision was limited and did not cover
other technologies such as cloud computing.
In politically gridlocked Washington, the
justices, particularly Chief Justice John
Roberts, could be feeling institutional
pressure to come together rather than pull
apart, Harvard law professor Richard Fallon
said.
“We have this enormous gap in politics
today, between liberals and conservatives,”
Fallon said. “The chief justice may be
naturally concerned that people not look at
the Supreme Court and see it divided in this
same way.”
But the justices found themselves more apart
than together on Monday. Sitting alongside
each other on the long mahogany bench,
Alito and Ginsburg barely looked at each
other while reading from their opinions.

The justices also ruled narrowly, and even
unanimously, in some major business cases,

447

“After Hobby Lobby, Business Revives Contraception Fight”
Law 360
Kelly Knaub
July 30, 2014

The Mennonite owners of a Pennsylvania
furniture manufacturing company who
unsuccessfully argued that the new federal
mandate that they pay for contraceptive
services violated their First Amendment
rights asked a Pennsylvania federal court
Wednesday to block the requirement,
following the U.S. Supreme Court's Hobby
Lobby decision.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., and its
owners,
the
Hahn
family,
told
Pennsylvania’s Eastern District that it is
entitled to an injunction in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s June 30 Hobby Lobby
decision, which found that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act applies to closely
held companies and shields them from
having to provide contraception coverage to
their employees.
In an amended motion filed two days prior
to its brief, the furniture company said that
its health insurance will not currently take
any action to omit items that violate its
religious beliefs.
“An injunction is needed to protect plaintiffs
and their health insurance carrier from the
mandate and its attendant penalties, so that
the burden on plaintiffs’ religious beliefs can
be lifted and plaintiffs’ health insurance plan
can once again omit items that violate
plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious belief that
the prescribed items are potentially
abortifacient including education and
counseling for the same,” the company said.

After the district court denied the furniture
company’s bid for a preliminary injunction
in January 2013, it appealed to the Third
Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s
decision last July. Conestoga then petitioned
the Supreme Court, which agreed in
November to take up the cases filed by
Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. and Conestoga in
order to resolve a circuit split over the
Affordable Care Act provision, with the
Tenth Circuit having ruled in Hobby
Lobby's favor.
In a 5-4 vote on June 30, the high court
created an exemption to the health care law's
requirement that for-profit companies offer
birth control coverage to their employees,
saying that closely held for-profit
corporations are entitled to religious
freedom protections. But it refused to
expand that ruling to other medical practices
such as blood transfusions or vaccinations.
The contraception mandate required that
companies with more than 50 employees to
provide female employees covered by a
company health plan with specified
contraceptive coverage at no cost, or face
financial penalties.
Although Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli Jr. claimed during oral arguments in
March that siding with family-owned Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga would ultimately
infringe on their employees' rights, the
majority opinion noted that the federal
government had already provided several
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exemptions to religious organizations and
nonprofits, and the mandate-at-issue isn't the
least restrictive means of providing
contraception coverage to workers.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, who wrote the
majority opinion, maintained that the ruling
wouldn't protect employers who illegally
discriminate against workers under the guise
of their religious beliefs.
Hobby Lobby repeatedly told the Supreme
Court that corporations frequently engage in
religious exercise, as the government
concedes with its exemptions for nonprofit
religious
organizations,
and
no
constitutional right — including that of
religious freedom — turns on the tax status
of a corporation, a premise the majority of
the justices ultimately agreed with.
But Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who wrote
the principal dissent, blasted the majority
opinion and noted that closely held
companies can still be massive organizations
worth billions of dollars.
More than 80 amicus briefs were filed in the
case from a wide range of advocacy,
medical, legal and religious groups, dozens
of states, and more than 100 federal
lawmakers, among others.
"With the Supreme Court’s recent ruling
upholding a family business’ religious

freedom, Conestoga Wood renewed their
request for an injunction," Kevin Theriot,
attorney Conestoga, told Law360. "The
Supreme Court's ruling makes it clear that
the government cannot coerce Conestoga
Wood to pay for abortion causing drugs in
violation of the religious convictions of the
Hahn family.”
Representatives for the U.S. government did
not immediately return a request for
comment Wednesday.
Conestoga Wood Specialties is represented
by Charles W. Proctor III of Law Offices of
Proctor Lindsay & Dixon LLC, Randall
Luke Wenger of Independence Law Center,
and David A. Cortman, Matthew S.
Bowman and Kevin Theriot of Alliance
Defending Freedom.
The U.S. government is represented by
Michelle R. Bennett of the U.S. Department
of Justice, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Stuart F. Delery, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Ian Heath
Gershengorn, U.S. Attorney Zane David
Memeger, Director Jennifer Ricketts and
Deputy Director Sheila M. Lieber.
The case is Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. et al. v. Sylvia M. Burwell et al., case
number 12-6744, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
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“What Hobby Lobby Shows Us About the Supreme Court and Civil Rights
Laws: Winners and Losers in the Roberts Court”
Huffington Post
Elliot Mincberg
July 24, 2014

In its recent decision in Hobby Lobby, the
conservative 5-4 majority -- Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy -- did something that may
appear very unusual. In divided cases, these
five Justices have the reputation for
interpreting very narrowly laws passed by
Congress to protect civil rights. So why did
they interpret so broadly the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a law
passed by Congress to protect the important
civil right of religious freedom? The answer,
unfortunately, is all too clear. Comparing
Hobby Lobby with the two rulings in civil
rights law cases issued by the Court over the
last year, the key factor that explains how
the conservative majority ruled is not
precedent, the language of the statute, or
congressional intent, but who wins and who
loses.
Let's start with last year's rulings, both of
which concerned Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act which bans employment
discrimination. In University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the
majority ruled very narrowly in interpreting
Title VII, deciding that the only way that
employees can prevail on a claim that they
have been fired in retaliation for raising job
bias claims is to prove that they would not
have been discharged "but for" the
retaliatory motive. This was despite the fact
that in order to strengthen Title VII,

Congress added language to the law in 1991
to make clear that plaintiffs should prevail if
they show that discrimination was a
"motivating factor" in a job decision. As
Justice Ginsburg explained in dissecting
Justice Alito's attempt for the majority to
draw a distinction between retaliation and
other claims under Title VII, the net effect
of the majority's ruling was to make it
harder to prove a Title VII retaliation claim
than before the 1991 law and with respect to
other civil rights statutes that don't explicitly
mention retaliation. The 5-4 majority had
"seized on a provision adopted by Congress
as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title
VII," she concluded, "and turned it into a
measure reducing the force of the ban on
retaliation."
In Nassar, in ruling against a doctor of
Middle Eastern descent in a case also
involving egregious ethnic and national
origin discrimination, Alito disregarded
clear legislative history and language
showing Congress' broad intent, as well as
the interpretation of the law by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Interestingly, towards the end of
his opinion, Alito appeared to reveal a key
consideration behind the majority's decision.
The ruling was important, he explained, to
"the fair and responsible allocation of
resources in the judicial and litigation
systems." After all, he pointed out,
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retaliation claims "are being made with
ever-increasing frequency," although he did
not even consider how many have been
proven meritorious. Agreeing with the
EEOC and the plaintiff on the "motivating
factor" standard, he wrote instead, "could
also contribute to the filing of frivolous
claims." As Justice Ginsburg put it, the
majority "appears driven by zeal to reduce
the number of retaliation claims against
employers."
The other 2013 Title VII ruling also
reflected an extremely narrow reading of the
law. Vance v. Ball State University
concerned a complaint by an AfricanAmerican woman that she had been
subjected to racial harassment and a racially
hostile work environment. Under prior Title
VII Court rulings agreed to by both
conservative and moderate Justices, the
employer itself is often liable for such
harassment claims when the harassment is
committed by an employee's supervisor. But
in Vance, in an opinion by Justice Alito, the
familiar 5-4 Court majority significantly
narrowed Title VII. It ruled that such
vicarious employer liability applies only
when the harassment is committed by a
manager who can fire or reduce the pay or
grade of the victim, not when it is
committed by a manager who does not have
that power but does control the day-to-day
schedules, assignments, and working
environment of the victim.
As Justice Ginsburg explained in dissent, the
majority's holding again contradicted
guidance issued by the EEOC as well as
Congress' broad purpose to eliminate
workplace discrimination. In fact, she

pointed out, not even the university
defendant in Vance itself "has advanced the
restrictive definition the Court adopts." But
again, Alito's opinion betrayed part of the
majority's true motives. Its narrow
interpretation would be "workable" and
"readily applied," Alito explained. And it
would promote "the limitation of employer
liability in certain circumstances."
Something very different happened in the
next Supreme Court case interpreting a
Congressional civil rights statute: 2014's
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.
In that case, the same 5-4 majority that
narrowly interpreted Title VII in Vance and
Nassar adopted a very broad interpretation
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). All nine Justices agreed that RFRA
was enacted by Congress in response to the
Supreme Court decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, which restricted the
protection of religious liberty by the Court
under the First Amendment. But the 5-4
majority in Hobby Lobby ruled that RFRA
provides "very broad protection for religious
liberty" - "even broader protection than was
available" under the First Amendment in
pre-Smith decisions. As Justice Ginsburg put
it in dissent, the majority interpreted RFRA
"as a bold initiative departing from, rather
than restoring, pre-Smith jurisprudence."
She explained further that this broad
interpretation contradicted the language of
the statute, its legislative history, and a
statement by the Court in a unanimous
ruling in 2006 that in RFRA, Congress
"adopt[ed] a statutory rule comparable to the
constitutional rule rejected in Smith."
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This difference in statutory interpretation
was critical to the majority's ruling in Hobby
Lobby -- that for-profit corporations whose
owners had religious objections to
contraceptives could invoke RFRA to refuse
to obey the Affordable Care Act's mandate
that they provide their employees with
health plans under which contraceptives are
available to female employees. As Justice
Ginsburg explained, no previous Court
decision under RFRA or the First
Amendment had ever "recognized a forprofit corporation's qualification for a
religious exemption" and such a ruling
"surely is not grounded in the pre-Smith
precedent Congress sought to preserve." The
5-4 majority's broad interpretation that
RFRA applies to for-profit corporations like
Hobby Lobby was obviously crucial to its
holding.
In addition, however, the 5-4 majority went
beyond pre-Smith case-law in another
crucial respect. Before a person can claim an
exemption from a generally applicable law
under RFRA, he or she must prove that the
law "substantially burden[s] a person's
exercise of religion." According to the
majority, the corporations in Hobby Lobby
met that standard by demonstrating that the
use of certain contraceptives that could be
purchased by their employees under their
health plans would seriously offend the
deeply held religious beliefs of their owners.
As Justice Ginsburg explained, however,
that ruling conflicted with pre-Smith case
law on what must be shown to prove a
"substantial burden." In several pre-Smith
cases, the Court had ruled that there was no
"substantial burden" created by, for
example, the government's use of a social

security number to administer benefit
programs or its requirement that social
security taxes be paid, despite the genuine
and sincere offense that these actions caused
to some religious beliefs. As Justice
Ginsburg stated, such religious "beliefs,
however deeply held, do not suffice to
sustain a RFRA claim," except under the
extremely broad interpretation of RFRA by
the 5-4 Court majority.
As in the Title VII cases, Justice Alito's
opinion for the 5-4 majority in Hobby Lobby
was revealing about some of the majority's
underlying concerns. In explaining the
majority's decision to interpret RFRA as
applying to for-profit corporations, Justice
Alito noted that "[w]hen rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the
rights of these people" - in this case "the
humans who own and control those
companies" in the Hobby Lobby case. As
Justice Ginsburg observed, the 5-4 majority
paid little attention to the Court's
pronouncement in a pre-Smith case that
permitting a religious exemption to a general
law for a corporation would "operate[e] to
impose the employer's religious faith on the
employees" of the corporation.
Even
though the Supreme Court's 2013-14 rulings
that interpreted civil rights laws passed by
Congress may seem different, a common
theme animates them all. Whether the 5-4
majority interpreted the statutes broadly or
narrowly, the losers in all of them were
women, minorities, and working people, and
the
winners
were
employers
and
corporations. In the majority's own words,
the result is the "limitation of employer
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liability" under laws like Title VII designed
to protect workers and the "protecting" of
the "humans who own and control"
corporations under RFRA.
Since
all
these
rulings
interpret
Congressional statutes, not the Constitution,
Congress clearly has the authority to reverse
them. In fact, Congress has done exactly that
with respect to other 5-4 rulings by the
Court that misinterpreted civil rights statutes
to harm women and minority workers and
benefit their corporate employers. As
recently as 2009, the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act reversed a flawed 5-4 ruling that
severely restricted workers' ability to file

equal pay claims under Title VII. Congress
is already considering legislation to reverse
many of the effects of Hobby Lobby, a
corrective effort that Senate Republicans
have blocked by a filibuster to prevent the
full Senate from even considering it. In our
currently divided Congress, immediate
prospects for the passage of such remedial
legislation may not appear promising. But it
is important to recognize the current 5-4
majority's pattern of favoring corporations
and harming workers in its decisions
interpreting federal civil rights laws, and to
recognize and act on the ability to reverse
these harmful rulings.
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“Satanists Troll Hobby Lobby”
The Atlantic
Emma Green
July 30, 2014

Sometimes American religious liberty gets
weird. An Amish person can be sent to
prison for shearing the beard of another
Amish person. A gentile can discover a love
for kosher food in prison. And the same
laws that protect the religious freedom of
evangelical Christians also apply to devoted
Satanists.
This week, the Satanists made moves to
claim their share of liberty. The Satanic
Temple,
a
putatively
diabolical
denomination, announced it's seeking a
religious exemption for people who live in
states with "informed consent" laws that
require doctors to share certain information
with women before they get an abortion.
This sometimes includes materials about
"the link between abortion and breast
cancer, as well as claims regarding a
depressive 'post-abortion syndrome,'" the
Satanic Temple claims, which they see as
"'scientifically unfounded' and 'medically
invalid' and therefore an affront to their
religious beliefs."
Objections to informed-consent laws are not
new, but the Satanists' tactic is. They're
invoking the Supreme Court's ruling
in Hobby Lobby, which said that "closely
held" businesses with religious objections to
contraceptives cannot be required to cover
them in the insurance they provide to their
employees, as required by the Affordable
Care Act. The plaintiffs claimed the
mandate violated their religious beliefs, and

the Court agreed, saying in a 5-4 ruling that
the government had not devised the "least
restrictive means" of making contraceptives
affordable and accessible to women.
The Satanic Temple is inverting the context
of that ruling: It believes in a woman's right
to get an abortion without having to listen to
information its members see as nonscientific. This is rooted in the group's belief
in a "scientific understanding of the world,"
according to the press release.
As a thought experiment, this is fascinating,
because it tests the boundaries of the Hobby
Lobby ruling, asking: How will the Court's
decision change the nature of religiousliberty claims in the United States? This is
not the first time this question has come
up. The ruling has already encouraged
religious groups to petition the White House
for special consideration on matters like
non-discrimination against gay employees.
Here, though, the Satanists are pushing the
question further. As a serious proposition,
there are two big problems with the Satanic
Temple's case. The organization's legal
claims don't really hold up, and, as it turns
out, it's not Satanic.
First, the organization isn't actually seeking
an exemption through legal means, like a
lawsuit or a legislative change. Instead, it
has "drawn up a letter for women who are
considering an abortion. The letter explains
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our position and puts the care provider on
notice that a failure to respect our call for an
exemption from state—mandated informed
consent materials constitutes a violation of
our religious liberty."
But that letter is legally meaningless,
explained Ira Lupu, a law professor at
George Washington University. "These laws
create obligations for doctors to inform, not
obligations for women to listen or read," he
wrote in an email.
The Satanic Temple's spokesman, Lucien
Greaves, said in an email that the letter is a
first step. "We are not looking to initiate a
proactive lawsuit in revolt against antiabortion laws. We are prepared, however, to
go to court to defend our deeply held beliefs
if and when our religious liberties, as
outlined in our exemption letter, are not
respected."
But the problem is not just that the letter is
meaningless; it's unclear that informedconsent laws actually create a religious
burden on anyone, Satanist or not. The main
question in Hobby Lobby was whether the
law was a burden on religious practice, said
Eduardo Peñalver, the dean of the Cornell
University Law School. "The typical form a
burden is saying, 'I’m being coerced to do
something that my religious forbids me to
do, or coerced not to do something that my
religion requires me to do,'" he explained.
"I’m not sure how these informed-consent
laws would be framed in those terms—my
religion forbids me from hearing these
informed-consent disclosures?"

Temple wants to extend this exemption to
"all women who share our deeply held
belief." Peñalver said this undermines the
organization's claim. "If these are people
who are not members of the Satanist Temple
or adherents to Satanism, their basis for
objecting may not be religious," he said. "If
you’re going to raise a religious claim, you
have to have a religious point of view."
And this is where things get a little tricky for
the Satanic Temple. As Gideon Resnick
wrote in The Atlantic in February, "Lucien
Greaves" is actually a pseudonym used by a
man named Douglas Mesner. He isn't
actually much into Satan worship. “I think
that idea is silly,” he told Resnick. “I can’t
even conceive of that actually being the
case.” He added, “I mean, I try to respect
other people’s beliefs as far as that kind of
thing goes.”
According to Resnick, the Satanic Temple
only has about 20 active members; people
can join through an email listserv. Although
the size of the group doesn't directly affect
the strength of its religious-liberty claims,
their goals and actions do provide evidence
about how sincere they are. "To say your
religion is completely separated from your
politics is asinine," Mesner told Resnick in
February. "Our political actions are our
religion."
In short, if the Satanic Temple took this to
court, it would probably have a hard time
showing that informed-consent laws are a
violation of its sincerely held religious
beliefs, rather than a group of people's
political views.

The other problem is that the Satanic
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But as much as anything, the Satanic
Temple is trying to make a point: The
Supreme Court has accepted the earnestness
of one group's politically controversial
religious views, leaving an open question
about what qualifies as a sincerely held
religious belief. The ruling in Hobby
Lobby was made "in the context of a
familiar religious tradition, rather than one
outside of the mainstream," Peñalver said.
"We’re a religiously diverse country."

in the future, that’s a very difficult question
to answer."
Juxtaposing the religious beliefs of alleged
Satanists and evangelical Christians may
seem farcical, but it's revealing: It's not
enough to claim that a law you disagree with
violates your conscience; there are still
complicated legal tests for those claims. As
Lupu said, "This is politically serious and
legally a bit silly."

This case "seems self-consciously political
and theatrical," said Peñalver. But "in terms
of the kinds of religious claims we might see
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“Rules for Birth-Control Mandate after Hobby Lobby”
SCOTUS Blog
Lyle Denniston
August 22, 2014
The Obama administration, planning to
change its health insurance rules to satisfy
the Supreme Court’s ruling in June limiting
the federal birth-control mandate, proposed
on Friday that for-profit companies with
publicly traded stock will not qualify for a
new exemption…
The new rules appear to have two
purposes: to keep the mandate under the
Affordable Care Act within the new limits
required by the Court’s decision in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, but also to make
sure that women who work for employers
who object to the mandate for religious
reasons would continue to have access to
that coverage. The revisions would apply to
both for-profit businesses and non-profit
groups like religiously oriented charities,
hospitals, schools, and colleges.
In its June 30 decision, the Court by a fiveto-four vote gave businesses formed as
“closely held corporations” a new
exemption from the requirement that most
businesses must provide a variety of
pregnancy-preventive health care coverage
for their female workers, if the firm’s
owners have religious objections to those
services.
Before that ruling, government rules did not
allow for-profit firms any exemption from
that mandate, and it limited the exemption
that did exist for non-profit groups of a
religious nature. The Hobby Lobby decision

required a new exemption for some forprofit firms based on a federal law that
protects religious freedom, and a separate
action the Court took after that ruling – in a
case involving Wheaton College in Illinois –
ordered the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to ease the
mandate for that college (and, by
implication, for some other non-profit
groups).
In Friday’s action, HHS issued a new set of
birth-control rules in interim form and
sought comments from the public to help
shape the final rules. The proposed rule for
profit-making businesses is not yet in effect,
but the change for non-profit religious
groups is to take effect almost immediately.
Here, in summary, is what HHS is proposing
for for-profit businesses whose owners
object to the mandate:
* An exemption from the mandate would
only exist for a for-profit business organized
as a “closely-held corporation.”
* Two alternative definitions for such a
corporation were offered for comment, but
in both, the corporation would not be
eligible for an exemption based on its
religious objections if it had stock that is
publicly traded.
* One way to define such a corporation
would be by specifying a maximum number
of owners that it could have – with the
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public urged to help spell that out. The
alternative way would be by specifying a
minimum percentage of a total number of
owners who had actual ownership
concentrated among them – with the public
again asked help to spell that out.
* HHS is not committed to either of those
approaches, and asked for suggestions for
alternatives.
* The public was invited to make
suggestions on how a for-profit firm could
be required to prove that its owners have
established that they do have religious
objections to the mandate.
* If a corporation’s governing structure
takes action, in keeping with state law
governing corporations, to claim a religious
exemption, and then lets the government
know of its objection (by official form or by
a simple letter), that would be enough to put
the government on notice of the objection,
and it would then lead the government to
take steps to take over providing access to
the services independently of the owners and
at no cost to them or to the workers.

* The public was given sixty dates to submit
comments on the proposal, which is not yet
in effect.
Here, in summary, is what HHS is proposing
for non-profit groups of a religious nature
that object to the mandate:
* Instead of having to formally notify the
organization’s health plan administrator of
the religious objection, the organization
need only write to HHS to claim the
exemption. That would trigger HHS to take
over to provide contraceptive services,
independently of the organization and at no
cost to the organization or its workers.
* The public was invited to make comments
on the non-profit proposal, but HHS said
that this change would go into effect as soon
as it is formally published — in the next
issue of the government’s Federal
Register.
The
expanded
exemption
opportunity for non-profits followed
precisely the approach that the Supreme
Court had ordered in the Wheaton College
case on July 3.
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“Court Rules Against Notre Dame in Contraception Case”
Wall Street Journal
Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall
February 21, 2014
A federal appeals court Friday ruled against
the University of Notre Dame in a legal
proceeding
claiming
the
Obama
administration's
contraception-coverage
requirement is forcing it to violate its
religious beliefs.
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Chicago in a 2-1 ruling agreed with a lower
court that had turned away the school's
request for a temporary injunction sparing it
from the federal health law's contraception
requirement.
The university has argued the Affordable
Care Act's compromise arrangement
allowing religiously-affiliated nonprofits to
let insurance companies handle the
provision of birth control is inadequate,
because it still forces the university to be
complicit in something it believes to be
immoral.
Judge Richard Posner, who wrote the
majority opinion, was dismissive of the
claim.
"If the government is entitled to require that
female contraceptives be provided to women
free of charge, we have trouble
understanding how signing the form that
declares Notre Dame's authorized refusal to
pay for contraceptives for its students or
staff, and mailing the authorization
document to those [insurance] companies,
which under federal law are obligated to
pick up the tab, could be thought to 'trigger'

the provision of female contraceptives," he
wrote.
He also criticized the school's officials for
the timing of the legal action, which he
described as "awkward" because it came so
close to the date on which their new
insurance plan started.
"We are left with the question, what does
Notre Dame want us to do?" Judge Posner
asked.
In an arrangement to defuse a standoff with
the Catholic Church over the Affordable
Care Act, the Obama administration said
religiously affiliated institutions—such as
Notre Dame—could turn over responsibility
for providing contraception coverage to
insurers, which would inform employees
they were eligible for the coverage with no
additional premium or copayments. Dozens
of these institutions said that compromise
didn't go far enough and filed suit to exempt
themselves from the requirement entirely.
After the university failed to win the
injunction, it instructed its insurance plan
administrator to inform school employees
they are eligible for the separate
contraception arrangement while the case
continues.
The injunction ruling isn't the final word on
Notre Dame's case. It only determines that
the school to date hasn't made a strong
enough showing to block the requirement
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while a full legal challenge continues in
court.
A university spokesman said the school was
still reviewing the ruling but it continued to
believe "if we are compelled to be entangled
in one issue that violates our conscience we
could be entangled in others as well."
The case is one of several dozen lawsuits
challenging the contraception requirement

for religiously affiliated universities and
charities. The Supreme Court next month is
expected to hear a related case brought by
two religious owners of for-profit
businesses.
The business owners are arguing they should
be allowed to run their companies without
going against their religious beliefs by
including the morning-after pill in their
insurance plans.
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“Did Little Sisters of the Poor Win or Lose at the Supreme Court?”
Slate
Emily Bazelon
January 24, 2014
The Supreme Court said late Friday that the
Little Sisters of the Poor don’t have to fill
out the Obamacare form for nonprofit
religious groups seeking an accommodation
to the contraception mandate. Instead, in
order to get the exception, Little Sisters,
which provides housing to elderly people in
need, essentially has to provide the same
information to the Department of Health of
Human Services in a … form (or maybe it’s
a letter?) the court devised itself. Got that? I
know, it sounds weird, but that’s pretty
much the upshot of the court’s threesentence order, which will remain in effect
until the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals rules
in the case. And which “should not be
construed as an expression of the Court’s
views on the merits,” the order states.
If this is an odd compromise, well, it’s also a
tricky case. Liberal commentators have said
otherwise: There’s no serious problem of
religious freedom here, the New York Times
editorial
page and Slate’s Amanda
Marcotte argue, because all Obamacare asks
religious organizations to do is sign a form
certifying that they don’t provide
contraception—as they’ve already made
clear. These cases are about a single twopage form. But there is no clear answer to
what signing that form means—or even,
rather bizarrely, what concrete effect doing
so has.
There are about 20 lawsuits bubbling up
over this around the country, with religious

groups saying the form is the gateway to
authorizing contraception coverage, one
they don’t want to walk through. The
government responds that actually, for some
of the groups, signing the form will mean
nothing at all. Not signing, though, subjects
them all to hefty fines. The lower courts are
split over these cases, and so far most of
them have actually sided with the religious
groups rather than the government. And so,
understandably, first
Justice
Sonia
Sotomayor on her own and now the full
court have hit the pause button at this
preliminary stage, when what’s at issue isn’t
who wins but whether to delay the fines
while the courts wrestle with the underlying
questions. These cases involve the kind of
tangled facts that take time to sort out. In the
meantime, it doesn’t make sense to impose
big fines on groups like Little Sisters.
The Affordable Care Act requires health
insurers to cover comprehensive health care
for women, including a full menu of
contraception and sterilization services. The
Department of Health and Human Services
decided what to cover based on
recommendations by the Institute of
Medicine. The IOM brought together a
bunch of experts, who reached the obvious
conclusion: Yes, contraception is crucial to
basic health care for women. After all,
nearly half of pregnancies are unintended,
and those pregnancies can have adverse
health consequences.
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All good so far. The problem is that most of
us get health insurance through our
employers, and some of them object to birth
control on religious grounds. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, passed by
Congress to safeguard the free exercise of
religion in 1993, clearly applies to nonprofit
religious organizations. (Whether it also
applies to for-profit secular companies is
a separate question that the Supreme Court
will address later this term, in the Hobby
Lobby case and another one involving a
Mennonite cabinetmaker.) When the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
among others, kicked up a fuss about the
contraception mandate back in 2011, the
Obama administration created two different
exemptions. The first is for houses of
worship
(churches,
mosques,
and
synagogues). It’s a total exemption—these
employers don’t have to do anything to get it
and their employees have to pay for their
own contraception. The second kind is for
religious nonprofit organizations, and this
one is more like a partial accommodation.
These groups, which include Little Sisters of
the Poor, the University of Notre Dame, and
hundreds of others, have to sign the twopage form and send it to the “third-party
administrator” of their health insurance
plans. Those entities (TPAs for short) then
are bound to provide contraception to the
religious group’s employees, according to
the Obamacare regulations, without billing
or in any way involving the employer. The
government is supposed to pay instead, by
lowering the fees the TPA pays in the
federal health exchange.
The government, the objecting religious
groups, and various judges characterize this

accommodation in diametrically opposed
ways. Here is Chief Judge Philip Simon of
the Northern District of Indiana (a George
W. Bush appointee) rejecting a suit by the
University of Notre Dame:
Notre Dame wants to eat its cake,
and have it still, at the expense of
Congress, administrative agencies,
and the employees who will be
affected. Notre Dame is free to opt
out of providing the coverage itself,
but it can’t stop anyone else from
providing it. But that is essentially
what Notre Dame is requesting.
And here is Judge Brian Cogan of the
Eastern District of New York (another
George W. Bush appointee), agreeing with a
bunch of Catholic schools and hospitals that
compelling them to sign the form, or face
heavy fines, violates their religious freedom:
The non-exempt plaintiffs are
required to complete and submit the
self-certification, which authorizes a
third-party
to
provide
the
contraceptive coverage to which they
object. They consider this to be an
endorsement of such coverage; to
them,
the
self-certification
“compel[s]
affirmation
of
a
repugnant belief.
Honestly, isn’t this like a picture you can
look at and see two entirely different things?
One view is that asking Little Sisters of the
Poor to sign this form is like asking a
Quaker to state his or her opposition to
fighting a war in order to be considered a
conscientious objector. You can’t argue that
saying you refuse to fight itself burdens your
freedom of religious expression because it
means someone else will go to war. But
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maybe that’s the wrong way to look at it.
The alternate view is that demanding Little
Sisters of the Poor sign this form to avoid a
big fine compels the group to ask someone
else to sin on its behalf. If you see this as the
group opening the door to getting their
employees birth control, which they have a
genuine religious objection to doing, then
maybe it’s not fair to ask them to do that.
I don’t know about you, but I can see it both
ways. Important note: Even if you choose
the second view and think this Obamacare
regulation does burden the exercise of
religious freedom, you haven’t decided the
case yet. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act says you must then decide whether there
is a compelling reason for the government to
impose the burden in the first place. On this
one, to me the answer is a clear yes, because
of the tangible and significant health
benefits for women that come with covering
contraception.
But the strange thing about the case brought
by Little Sisters of the Poor is that the
government now says that if the group signs
the form, its employees will be zero steps
closer to getting their birth control covered.
Huh? I know, it sounds crazy, because what
exactly is this case about if that’s true? But
it is. The government has realized that Little
Sisters provides health care through “church
plans” that are governed by another federal
law, ERISA. And under ERISA, church
plans cannot be obligated to cover
contraception. That goes for their third-party
administrators, too. So if Little Sisters of the
Poor were to sign this form, its TPA,
Christian Brothers Services, wouldn’t have
to arrange for a single IUD or birth control

prescription.
On
the
law
blog Balkanization, Marty Lederman calls
this a “lacuna” that the government
“presumably did not anticipate.”
You can argue, as the government has tried
to before the Supreme Court, that this means
there is no religious burden at stake for
Little Sisters. No birth control, no lawsuit.
But I would also like to know what the point
is of making the group sign this Obamacare
form? Why push them to authorize
contraceptive care, even theoretically, if the
whole thing is an empty exercise? How can
the government show it has a compelling
interest in making nothing happen? Or as
Daniel Blomberg, a lawyer for the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty, which represents
Little Sisters, put it to me over the phone,
“When does the government force you to
either engage in meaningless speech or pay
millions of dollars?” Blomberg also argues
that Little Sisters can’t know for sure it’s in
the clear, because the government hasn’t
entirely given up on enforcing the
contraception mandate in this case. Its
lawyers told one judge that the Obama
administration "continues to consider
potential options to fully and appropriately
extend the consumer protections provided
by the regulations to self-insured church
plans."
Also, some of the religious groups that are
suing don’t offer ERISA-based church
plans, so they don’t fall into the gap between
these two different sets of regulations. Notre
Dame, for example, has decided to go ahead
and sign the Obamacare form, knowing that
its employees will actually get contraception
coverage, while the lawsuit it has brought
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continues to play out. This case, and others
by religious groups who are clearly subject
to the contraception mandate, are the more
interesting ones, which will eventually
determine the outcome of this clash between
religious freedom (arguably) and women’s
health. Now that the Supreme Court has
issued its Friday order, the action moves
back to the lower courts. Godspeed to them.
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